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ABSTRACT
California voters passed Proposition 11 (the Privacy Initiative) in 1972,
amending the state constitution to include a fundamental right to privacy.
The ballot arguments for Proposition 11 expressed the voters’ intent to
set a high bar for invaders to justify privacy invasions: requiring a compelling
public need. For the first twenty years of the new constitutional privacy
right’s existence, courts required invaders of individual privacy to meet
the compelling public need standard to justify such invasions.
Yet the courts reversed course in 1994, abandoned the compelling public
need standard, and have since applied a standard that perverts the electorate’s
intent: now, the individual must establish a compelling privacy interest against
invasions. This approach to California’s constitutional privacy right has
sabotaged the Privacy Initiative. This Article presents six substantive arguments
for abandoning the current approach and returning this area of the law
to its original intent. This Article supports its substantive analysis with an
empirical case study showing that the current approach maimed California’s
constitutional privacy right.
It’s time to reset this area of the law. California courts should abandon
the current analytical approach to the state’s constitutional privacy right
and restore the original interpretation of the Privacy Initiative: the compelling
public need test that the voters intended.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1972, California voters amended article I, section 1 of the California
Constitution to include privacy among the state constitution’s enumerated
inalienable rights. 1 Proposition 11, a legislatively proposed initiative
constitutional amendment, added the emphasized words: “All people are
1.
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by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these
are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and
protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and
privacy.”2
The ballot arguments show that the voters intended Proposition 11—
commonly called the Privacy Initiative—to confirm that California citizens
enjoy broader privacy protections than those available under the federal
constitution.3 Proposition 11 was driven by public concern over government
snooping and a fear that technological advancements had enabled private
entities and the government to collect massive troves of personal
information.4 The voters intended the new constitutional privacy right to
shield personal privacy and guard against the unnecessary collection
or misuse of private information.5 But while technological advances since
1972 have only sharpened these concerns, California courts have moved
constitutional privacy doctrine backward.
In its first decision construing the Privacy Initiative, the California
Supreme Court applied the compelling public need test that appears
several times in the ballot arguments.6 Yet the court soon retreated, and
since 1994 its decisions have fractured into various context-dependent
approaches that focus on interest balancing. The only consistent theme
since those initial privacy decisions is the failure to acknowledge the
electorate’s intent that the privacy right may be abridged “only when there
is a compelling public need.”7 Now, instead of requiring the invader to
show a compelling public need to overcome a privacy claim, the
individual must prove a privacy interest strong enough to overcome the
invader’s legitimate interest in the information.8 This requirement is a
2. Assemb. Const. Amend. 51, 1972 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1972) (emphasis
added). The California Constitution gives the Legislature power to propose constitutional
amendments. See CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1. Proposed amendments must pass by a
two-thirds majority in each house of the Legislature and are then placed on the ballot for
majority approval by the voters. Id. §§ 1, 4. On November 7, 1972, California voters
approved Proposition 11, 62.9% to 37.1%. EDMUND G. BROWN JR., CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE,
STATEMENT OF VOTE: GENERAL ELECTION NOVEMBER 7, 1972, at 28 (1972).
3. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CONSTITUTION: PROPOSITIONS AND PROPOSED
LAWS TOGETHER WITH ARGUMENTS, GENERAL ELECTION, TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 7, 1972,
at 26 (1972) [hereinafter “PROPOSED AMENDMENTS”].
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 224, 234 (Cal. 1975).
7. See PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 3, at 28.
8. See infra note 222 and accompanying text.
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fundamental error of ballot measure interpretation because it reverses
the electorate’s intent, placing the primary and higher burden on the
individual rather than the invader. The California Supreme Court should
revisit this issue and adopt an approach that is consistent with the
electorate’s intent that constitutional privacy claims be judged against a
compelling public need standard.
II. GENESIS OF CALIFORNIA’S CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY RIGHT
Proposition 11 arose in the context of several distinct sources of authority
and a concern for privacy:





The federal constitutional privacy right, which developed
into its current form along with the vote on Proposition 11.
The steady advance of computer technology and revelations
of widespread government surveillance, which fueled public
concern over the ability of the government and private entities
to collect and misuse private information.9
The California common law privacy right, which existed
before Proposition 11.

In the following sections, we briefly overview each of these factors to
show how they contributed to the electorate’s motivation in enacting the
Privacy Initiative.
A. Federal Privacy Doctrine
Privacy is not a stated right in the federal constitution. Instead, federal
constitutional privacy is a judicial creation. Beginning in 1965 with Griswold
v. Connecticut, the U.S. Supreme Court held that although the federal
constitution does not explicitly mention a right of privacy, the right exists
within the “penumbras” of certain provisions of the U.S. Constitution and
the Bill of Rights.10 Four years later, in Stanley v. Georgia, the high court
explained that “the right to be free, except in very limited circumstances,
from unwanted governmental intrusions into one’s privacy” is “fundamental.”11
The Stanley opinion adopted Justice Brandeis’s concept of privacy from
his dissent in Olmstead v. United States:

9. Proposition 11’s legislative history is reproduced in J. Clark Kelso’s seminal
article on the state constitutional privacy right. J. Clark Kelso, California’s Constitutional
Right to Privacy, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 327, 417–25 (1992).
10. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483–85 (1965); see also id. at 486–87
(Goldberg, J., concurring).
11. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
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The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit
of happiness. They recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings
and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions
of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans
in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as
against the government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized man.12

Privacy next appeared as the foundational principle for federal constitutional
reproductive rights in Eisenstadt v. Baird: “If the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting
a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”13 Less than three
months after California voters approved the Privacy Initiative, the Court
issued its decisions in Roe v. Wade14 and Doe v. Bolton.15 Justice Blackmun’s
majority opinion in Roe justified the federal right to privacy:
The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. In a line of
decisions, however, going back perhaps as far as Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford,
141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891), the Court has recognized that a right of personal
privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the
Constitution. In varying contexts, the Court or individual Justices have, indeed,
found at least the roots of that right in the First Amendment, in the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments, in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights, in the Ninth Amendment,
or in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment. These decisions make it clear that only personal rights that can
be deemed “fundamental” or “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” are included
in this guarantee of personal privacy.16

12. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
see Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564 (quoting Justice Brandeis’s Olmstead dissent). Justice Brandeis
had long championed the right to privacy; he first set forth the pedigree of the common law
right to privacy in a landmark law review article published nearly forty years before
Olmstead. See generally Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,
4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
13. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
14. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
15. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
16. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152 (citations omitted). The Court concluded:
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s
concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or,
as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights
to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not
to terminate her pregnancy.
Id. at 153.
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Those decisions, issued contemporaneously with California voters approving
Proposition 11 in November 1972,17 are the federal law background for
the California Supreme Court’s first constitutional privacy decision in
White v. Davis.18 The U.S. Supreme Court’s privacy jurisprudence evolved
along with growing public unease a bout government surveillance and
a recognition that advancements in computer technology enabled the
government and private businesses to compile comprehensive files on
citizens.19 As discussed below, those same concerns animated Proposition
11’s drafters.
The California and federal constitutional rights to privacy are distinct.
Like its federal counterpart, the state right to privacy extends to both
informational and autonomy privacy.20 Although the California right is
codified in the state constitution, the federal right is only implied: “The
federal constitutional right of privacy . . . enjoys no such explicit constitutional
status.”21 Thus, the state right should be broader than its federal counterpart.22
From this distinction we conclude that while federal privacy decisions
may be persuasive authority, federalism principles teach that California
courts are not bound to follow federal privacy decisions when interpreting
the California Constitution: the state constitution “is, and always has
been, a document of independent force” from the federal constitution. 23
17. See BROWN, supra note 2, at 28.
18. White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222 (Cal. 1975).
19. Although the legislative history does not provide specifics on this point, the late
1960s and early 1970s saw several high-profile revelations of covert government surveillance
programs. In 1970, Washington Monthly published an article alleging that the U.S. Army
maintained a robust data gathering system that tracked civilian political activity. Christopher
H. Pyle, CONUS Intelligence: The Army Watches Civilian Politics, WASH. MONTHLY, Jan.
1970, at 49. This program was the subject of a Senate investigation and made its way to
the U.S. Supreme Court in Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972). And in the spring of 1971, a
group calling itself the “Citizens’ Commission to Investigate the FBI” burglarized a small
FBI field office in Pennsylvania and stole over 1,000 classified documents, which revealed
that the FBI had been conducting a long-running domestic surveillance program known as
“COINTELPRO.” Betty Medsger & Ken W. Clawson, Stolen Documents Describe FBI
Surveillance Activities, WASH. P OST, Mar. 24, 1971, at A1, A11; Betty Medsger & Ken
W. Clawson, Thieves Got Over 1,000 FBI Papers, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 1971, at A1.
20. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the U.S. Supreme Court
described privacy as a protected interest implied within the “penumbra” of the enumerated,
individual fundamental rights. 381 U.S. at 483. The U.S. Supreme Court later found
a federal implied right to privacy to include informational privacy in Whalen v. Roe, 429
U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977). The California Supreme Court has consistently affirmed that
the right extends to informational and autonomy privacy. See White, 533 P.2d at 233–34;
Valley Bank v. Superior Court, 542 P.2d 977, 979 (Cal. 1975).
21. Comm. to Def. Reprod. Rts. v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 784 (Cal. 1981).
22. City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 610 P.2d 436, 440 n.3 (Cal. 1980).
23. Myers, 625 P.2d at 783. This principle is enshrined in the state’s constitution:
“Rights guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the
United States Constitution.” CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24.
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Accordingly, “state courts, in interpreting constitutional guarantees contained
in state constitutions, are‘independently responsible for safeguarding the
rights of their citizens.’”24 And the California Supreme Court has observed
that “the federal right of privacy in general appears to be narrower than what
the voters approved in 1972 when they added ‘privacy’ to the California
Constitution.”25 The upshot: there is no argument that California’s constitutional
privacy right should be linked to or limited by federal law.
B. Early California Privacy Doctrine
Before Proposition 11 was adopted in 1972, privacy in California was
a common law right that first appeared in 1931.26 The constitutional right
did not codify the existing common law remedy—it was a new right.27
Proposition 11 “was never intended to eliminate the common law tort for
invasion of privacy.”28 And the common law privacy tort is still employed
24. Myers, 625 P.2d at 783 (quoting People v. Brisendine, 531 P.2d 1099, 1113
(Cal. 1975)).
25. City of Santa Barbara, 610 P.2d at 440 n.3. The court reaffirmed that the federal
privacy right is narrower than the California constitutional privacy right in American Academy
of Pediatrics v. Lungren:
[N]ot only is the state constitutional right of privacy embodied in explicit
constitutional language not present in the federal Constitution, but past
California cases establish that, in many contexts, the scope and application of
the state constitutional right of privacy is broader and more protective of privacy
than the federal constitutional right of privacy as interpreted by the federal
courts.
Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 808 (Cal. 1997) (plurality opinion).
26. Kinsey v. Macur, 165 Cal. Rptr. 608, 612 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980); Melvin v. Reid,
297 P. 91, 93 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931). As early as 1931, California courts began
recognizing invasion of privacy as a tort; notably, in Melvin:
[P]laintiff, a prostitute, was charged with murder and acquitted after a very long
and very public trial. She abandoned her life of shame, married and assumed a
place in respectable society, making many friends who were not aware of the
incidents of her earlier life. The court held that she had stated a cause of action
for privacy against defendants who had made a movie based entirely on Mrs.
Melvin’s life some seven years after the trial.
Kinsey, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 613.
27. Porten v. Univ. of S.F., 134 Cal. Rptr. 839, 841 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (“The
elevation of the right to be free from invasions of privacy to constitutional stature was
apparently intended to be an expansion of the privacy right.”); 1 MICHAEL PAUL THOMAS
ET AL., CALIFORNIA CIVIL PRACTICE: TORTS § 20:18 (2020) (noting that the California
Constitution “may provide the plaintiff with a cause of action where the common law torts
are not available”).
28. Kinsey, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
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as a standalone claim today.29 Thus, California constitutional and common
law privacy are distinct, and alleging a violation of the common law right
is different from alleging a constitutional violation.30
The elements required to plead each claim are different. Pleading a common
law privacy invasion cause of action requires alleging the facts constituting
the right of privacy, the wrongful invasion, and the resulting injury. 31
Pleading a constitutional privacy invasion cause of action requires alleging
a legally protected privacy interest, a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the circumstances, and conduct by defendant constituting a serious invasion
of privacy. And the invasion must be sufficiently serious in its nature,
scope, and actual or potential impact to constitute an egregious breach of
social norms.32
California’s constitutional privacy right is therefore neither linked to
nor limited by the common law remedy. Unfortunately, as discussed below,
some cases erroneously conflate the common law and constitutional rights.
III. THE VOTERS INTENDED A COMPELLING PUBLIC NEED TEST
We rely on two primary sources for evidence to support our argument
that the voters intended Proposition 11 to impose a compelling public need
test on constitutional privacy claims. One is the ballot arguments, which
California courts consult as conclusive evidence of voter intent. The other
is the first, contemporaneous interpretation of Proposition 11 by the
California Supreme Court, which is better evidence of original intent than
a reinterpretation twenty years after the fact.
A. The Ballot Arguments Impose a Compelling Public Need Standard
The ballot argument is the starting point when determining voter intent
for an initiative constitutional amendment if its text is unclear, which is
true for Proposition 11. California courts first consider a ballot measure’s
plain text to determine the drafter’s intent. Because Proposition 11 simply
added “and privacy” to article I, section 1, the measure’s language alone
does not explain how courts should resolve claimed privacy violations.
Thus, the next step is to analyze the ballot arguments and other legislative

29. Catsouras v. Dep’t of the Cal. Highway Patrol, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 352, 366 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2010) (finding that decedent’s family members had sufficient privacy interest in
accident scene photographs to maintain invasion ofprivacy action).
30. Ignat v. Yum! Brands, Inc., 154 Cal. Rptr. 3d 275, 284–85 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013);
see also Kinsey, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 612 (noting that the constitutional right to privacy
supports, rather than replaces, the common law invasion of privacy tort).
31. 5 B.E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE: PLEADING § 746 (5th ed. 2020).
32. THOMAS ET AL., supra note 27.
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history. When a term in an initiative is neither self-explanatory nor defined
in the text, California courts examine the ballot pamphlet arguments as
evidence of the voters’ intent.33 The focus in that interpretation process is to
determine and implement the drafter’s intent. 34 As with any initiative
constitutional amendment, the legislative history and ballot arguments are
decisive evidence of that intent.35
We begin with the fundamental rule that our primary task is to determine the
lawmakers’ intent. In the case of a constitutional provision enacted by the voters,
their intent governs. To determine intent, “[t]he court turns first to the words
themselves for the answer.” “If the language is clear and unambiguous there
is no need for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of
the Legislature (in the case of a statute) or of the voters (in the case of a provision
adopted by the voters).”36

The indicia of intent here show an unequivocal purpose to impose a
compelling public need standard:


Proposition 11’s legislative history reflects a concern that the
common law right to privacy was insufficient to check
government interference with citizens’ private lives. One
Assembly committee staff report argued: “With the technological
revolution and the age of cybernetics, these amendments [to
the U.S. Constitution], as they have been traditionally viewed,
do not offer sufficient protection against state surveillance,

33. Legislature v. Eu, 816 P.2d 1309, 1315 (Cal. 1991).
34. See, e.g., Avila v. Citrus Cmty. Coll. Dist., 131 P.3d 383, 390 (Cal. 2006)
(quoting Esberg v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 47 P.3d 1069, 1072 (Cal. 2002)).
35. Ballot arguments are the principal piece of evidence for the original public
understanding of the state’s constitutional right to privacy. The California Supreme Court
has explained that the “[ballot] statement . . . represents, in essence, the only ‘legislative
history’ of the constitutional amendment available to us.” White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222,
234 (Cal. 1975). The Privacy Initiative’s ballot argument was prepared by the initiative’s
sponsors, then-Assemblyman Ken Cory and then-Senator George Moscone, who would
each go on to a larger political stage. See PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 3, at 27.
Cory served three terms as State Controller from 1974 to 1986. Ken Cory; State Controller,
Assemblyman, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 14, 1998, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/
la-xpm-1998-nov-14-mn-42652-story.html [https://perma.cc/VC49-LW46]. Moscone served
as mayor of San Francisco from 1976 until his assassination in November 1978. Ryan Levi,
Remembering George Moscone, ‘The People’s Mayor’ of San Francisco, KQED (Nov. 27,
2018), https://www.kqed.org/news/11708263/remembering-george-moscone-the-peoplesmayor- of-san-francisco [https://perma.cc/L29Z-VEQ5].
36. Delaney v. Superior Court, 789 P.2d 934, 940 (Cal. 1990) (quoting Brown v.
Kelly Broad. Co., 771 P.2d 406, 412 (Cal. 1989); and then quoting Lungren v. Deukmejian,
755 P.2d 299, 303–04 (Cal. 1988)).
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record collection and government snooping into our personal
lives. We must, therefore, develop new safeguards to meet
the new dangers.”37 The solution was to install a privacy right
in the California Constitution: it “put[] the State on record
that privacy is essential to our other freedoms.”38
The ballot arguments contain repeated references to an intent
to require that invaders prove a compelling public need. The
full text of the Proposition 11 arguments follows, which
in several places describes privacy as a “fundamental” and
“compelling” interest that may be abridged only by an equally
“compelling” “public” “need” or “necessity.” Those terms are
bolded where they appear; the underlining is original.
Ballot Pamphlet Arguments for Proposition 1139
(1972)
Argument in Favor of Proposition 11

The proliferation of government snooping and data collecting is threatening
to destroy our traditional freedoms. Government agencies seem to be
competing to compile the most extensive sets of dossiers of American
citizens. Computerization of records makes it possible to create “cradleto-grave” profiles on every American.
At present there are no effective restraints on the information activities
of government and business. This amendment creates a legal and enforceable
right of privacy for every Californian.
The right of privacy is the right to be left alone. It is a fundamental
and compelling interest. It protects our homes, our families, our thoughts,
our emotions, our expressions, our personalities, our freedom of communion,
and our freedom to associate with the people we choose. It prevents government
and business interests from collecting and stockpiling unnecessary information
about us and from misusing information gathered for one purpose in order
to serve other purposes or to embarrass us.
Fundamental to our privacy is the ability to control circulation of
personal information. This is essential to social relationships and personal
freedom. The proliferation of government and business records over
which we have no control limits our ability to control our personal lives.
Often we do not know that these records even exist and we are certainly
unable to determine who has access to them.
37. Kelso, supra note 9, at 474 (discussing the staff report of Assembly Constitutional
Committee on ACA 51).
38. Id.
39. See PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 3, at 26–27.
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Even more dangerous is the loss of control over the accuracy of
government and business records on individuals. Obviously, if the person
is unaware of the record, he or she cannot review the file and correct
inevitable mistakes. Even if the existence of this information is known,
few government agencies or private businesses permit individuals to
review their files and correct errors.
The average citizen also does not have control over what information is
collected about him. Much is secretly collected. We are required to report
some information, regardless of our wishes for privacy or our belief that
there is no public need for the information. Each time we apply for a
credit card or a life insurance policy, file a tax return, interview for a job,
or get a drivers’ license, a dossier is opened and an information profile is
sketched. Modern technology is capableof monitoring, centralizing and
computerizing this information which eliminates any possibility of individual
privacy.
The right of privacy is an important American heritage and essential to
the fundamental rights guaranteed by the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and
Ninth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. This right should be abridged
only when there is compelling public need. Some information may
remain as designated public records but only when the availability of such
information is clearly in the public interest.40
Rebuttal to Argument in Favor of Proposition 11
To say that there are at present no effective restraints on the information
activities of government and business is simply untrue. In addition to
literally hundreds of laws restricting what use can be made of information,
every law student knows that the courts have long protected privacy as
one of the rights of our citizens.
Certainly, when we apply for credit cards, life insurance policies, drivers’
licenses, file tax returns or give business interviews, it is absolutely essential
that we furnish certain personal information. Proposition 11 does not mean
that we will no longer have to furnish it and provides no protection as to
the use of the information that the Legislature cannot give if it so desires.
What Proposition 11 can and will do is to make far more difficult what is
already difficult enough under present law, investigating and finding out

40.

Id.
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whether persons receiving aid from various government programs are
truly needy or merely using welfare to augment their income.
Proposition 11 can only be an open invitation to welfare fraud and tax
evasion and for this reason should be defeated.41
Argument Against Proposition 11
Proposition 11, which adds the word “privacy” to a list of “inalienable
rights” already enumerated in the Constitution, should be defeated for
several reasons.
To begin with, the present Constitution states that there are certain
inalienable rights “among which are those” that it lists. Thus, our Constitution
does not attempt to list all of the inalienable rights nor as a practical matter,
could it do so. It has always been recognized by the law and the courts
that privacy is one of the rights we have, particularly in the enjoyment of
home and personal activities. So, in the first place, the amendment is
completely unnecessary.
....
The most important reason why this amendment should be defeated,
however, lies in an area where possibly privacy should not be completely
guaranteed. Most government welfare programs are an attempt by California’s
more fortunate citizens to assist those who are less fortunate; thus, today,
millions of persons are the beneficiaries of government programs, based
on the need of the recipient, which in turn can only be judged by his
revealing his income, assets and general ability to provide for himself.
If a person on welfare has his privacy protected to the point where he
need not reveal his assets and outside income, for example, how could it
be determined whether he should be given welfare at all?
Our government is helping many people who really need and deserve
the help. Making privacy an inalienable right could only bring chaos to
all government benefit programs, thus depriving all of us, including those
who need the help most.
And so because it is unnecessary, interferes with the work presently
being done by the Constitution Revision Commission and would emasculate
all government programs based on recipient need, I urge a “no” vote on
Proposition 11.42

41.
42.
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Rebuttal to Argument Against Proposition 11
The right to privacy is much more than “unnecessary wordage[.”] It is
fundamental in any free society. Privacy is not now guaranteed by our
State Constitution. This simple amendment will extend various court
decisions on privacy to insure protection of our basic rights.
....
The right to privacy will not destroy welfare nor undermine any
important government program. It is limited by “compelling public necessity”
and the public’s need to know. Proposition 11 will not prevent the
government from collecting any information it legitimately needs. It will
only prevent misuse of this information for unauthorized purposes and
preclude the collection of extraneous or frivolous information.43

The prevailing theme of the ballot arguments is the threat of technology
empowering the government and businesses to engage in widespread and
pervasive privacy invasions. The ballot argument defines the right to
privacy in broad terms that echo Justice Brandeis’s Olmstead dissent as
the right to be left alone being a fundamental and compelling interest.44 It
also focuses on the practical threat posed by modern technology to an
individual’s ability to control their personal information. The argument
closes by emphasizing that the right to privacy is rooted in federal
constitutional guarantees. The only argument against Proposition 11 was
that it would encourage welfare fraud and tax evasion by enabling people
to withhold information from the government.45 The opponent raised no
concern that a compelling public need standard would be too burdensome
for businesses or too difficult for courts to apply. The ballot arguments
make several things plain:

43. Id. at 28 (emphasis added).
44. See id. at 26; Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
45. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 3, at 27–28. The Rebuttal to Argument in
Favor of Proposition 11 and Argument Against Proposition 11 were prepared by Senator
James E. Whetmore. Id. The opponents also made a passing argument that the proposition was
“unnecessary” because “[i]t has always been recognized by the law and the courts that
privacy is one of the rights we have.” Id. at 27.
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The government has some legitimate informational needs.
But privacy is a fundamental interest. The arguments say this
twice.
So only a compelling public need can justify abridging privacy.
The arguments say this three times.

That the voters intended to impose a compelling public need standard
is apparent. The ballot arguments employ the term “compelling” several
times, both to describe the right as a compelling individual liberty interest
and to describe the equally compelling public need required to
counterbalance that interest. The upshot is that the ballot arguments show
that the voters intended to set a high bar for invaders to justify violations of
the new constitutional privacy right.
Yet the ballot arguments should not be read to require strict scrutiny.
The rebuttal makes this plain: “The right to privacy . . . is limited by
‘compelling public necessity’ and the public’s need to know. Proposition
11 will not prevent the government from collecting any information it
legitimately needs.”46 This makes clear that a genuine public need for
information can outweigh a privacy interest—when that need is compelling.
That is how the California Supreme Court interpreted Proposition 11 for
the first two decades after its enactment, as we explain in the next section.
B. The California Supreme Court Adopted a Compelling
Need Test in White v. Davis
In the first cases to consider the new constitutional privacy right created
by Proposition 11, the California Supreme Court used a compelling public
need test to review privacy claims. Just three years after its adoption, the
court construed the new privacy right in two cases: White v. Davis47 and
Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court.48 In White, the court held that
university students stated a constitutional privacy claim against police
officers who covertly infiltrated student groups, declaring that although
“the amendment does not purport to invalidate all such information gathering,
it does require that the government establish a compelling justification for
such conduct.”49 In Valley Bank, the court held that the new privacy clause
required banks to give customers reasonable notice and an opportunity to
object before disclosing their personal information.50

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
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Consistent with the ballot argument, the unanimous decision in White
applied a compelling public need test to justify privacy invasions. White
framed its analysis on the ballot arguments, explaining that the “moving
force” behind the constitutional amendment was “the accelerating encroachment
on personal freedom and security caused by increased surveillance and
data collection activity in contemporary society. The new provision’s
primary purpose is to afford individuals some measure of protection
against this most modern threat to personal privacy.” 51 The court relied
on the ballot argument’s repeated statement that “[t]he right should only
be abridged when there is compelling public need.”52 The White decision
concluded that the ballot arguments were “clear” evidence that privacy
infringements must be justified by a compelling need.53
C. White Did Not Endorse Absolute Privacy Rights
White set the stage for the key practical debate concerning privacy. The
decision recognized that privacy invasions could be justified, holding that
article I, section 1 “does not purport to prohibit all incursion into individual
privacy but rather that any such intervention must be justified by a
compelling interest.”54 Shortly after White, the California Supreme Court
noted that the right of privacy is not “absolute,” but must be balanced
against the need for disclosure.55 By 1983, the court observed that it was
“well established” that the right to privacy “may yield in the furtherance
of compelling state interests.”56 Decisions in this period about litigation
discovery established that courts must “indulge in a careful balancing” of
the right of litigants to obtain discovery against an individual’s privacy

51. White, 533 P.2d at 233; see id. at 225 (“[A] principal aim of the constitutional
provision is to limit the infringement upon personal privacy arising from the government’s
increasing collection and retention of data relating to all facets of an individual’s life.”).
52. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 3, at 27.
53. White, 533 P.2d at 234 (“[T]he statement makes clear that the amendment does
not purport to prohibit all incursion into individual privacy but rather that any such
intervention must be justified by a compelling interest.”).
54. Id. To that end, the court found that the allegations stated a prima facie claim for
invasion of privacy, but LAPD would have the opportunity “to designate the compelling
governmental interests upon which they rely for their intrusive conduct.” Id. at 234–35.
55. Loder v. Mun. Ct., 553 P.2d 624, 628 (Cal. 1976) (“The right of privacy added
to the California Constitution by a 1972 amendment of article I, section 1, is not absolute.”).
56. People v. Stritzinger, 668 P.2d 738, 742 (Cal. 1983).
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rights.57 These decisions began by valuing privacy at the level of a compelling
interest and required invaders to prove a similarly compelling need to
overcome the individual’s privacy right.
The White decision correctly read Proposition 11 as imposing a
compelling public need standard on the invader to justify the invasion,
and that analysis governed California constitutional privacy doctrine for
over twenty years. Between 1972 and 1994, California courts held that
the right to privacy protected a wide range of personal information, extending,
for example, to financial affairs,58 sexual relations,59 medical history,60 political
affiliations,61 and thoughts.62 That all ended in 1994.
IV. THE CURRENT STANDARD INVERTS AND DEFEATS PROPOSITION 11
The California Supreme Court abandoned White in 1994 when it decided
Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, where the court considered
a privacy claim raised by college athletes who claimed that a random
drug-testing program violated their constitutional privacy rights.63 The
court distinguished White as concerning privacy interests under First
Amendment free speech and association rights.64 The court then applied
common law privacy tort doctrine to reject the compelling public need
standard and reinterpret the state constitutional right to privacy.65
Almost immediately after deciding Hill, the court reframed its approach
again in Loder v. City of Glendale.66 The current doctrine combines
elements of both Hill and Loder and applies a “lesser-interest” balancing
test to balance privacy against any countervailing interests: an invasion
justified by a legitimate competing interest is not a constitutional violation,
and those legitimate interests derive from the legally authorized and socially
beneficial activities of government and private entities.67 For convenience,
we refer to this current analysis as Hill–Loder. That analysis reverses the
57. Valley Bank v. Superior Court, 542 P.2d 977, 979 (Cal. 1975); Doyle v. State
Bar, 648 P.2d 942, 945 (Cal. 1982); Schnabel v. Superior Court, 854 P.2d 1117, 1121 (Cal.
1993).
58. See, e.g., Valley Bank, 542 P.2d at 979.
59. Vinson v. Superior Court, 740 P.2d 404, 410 (Cal. 1987).
60. Britt v. Superior Court, 574 P.2d 766, 766 (Cal. 1978); Bd. of Med. Quality
Assurance v. Gherardini, 156 Cal. Rptr. 55, 61 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); Gross v. Recabaren,
253 Cal. Rptr. 820, 827 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
61. Britt, 574 P.2d at 772.
62. Long Beach City Emps. Ass’n v. City of Long Beach, 719 P.2d 660, 663 (Cal.
1986).
63. Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 637 (Cal. 1994).
64. Id. at 652.
65. Id. at 646–49.
66. Loder v. City of Glendale, 927 P.2d 1200, 1227 (Cal. 1997).
67. Lewis v. Superior Court, 397 P.3d 1011, 1019 (Cal. 2017).
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electorate’s intent for Proposition 11 in two ways: it places the burden of
proof on the individual, not the invader; and it requires the individual to
establish a higher interest, rather than the invader.
Before detailing our objections to the current test, we first show how
two key analytical errors formed the Hill–Loder approach.
A. The First Error: The Lucas Majority Opinion in Hill
Hill is a fractured decision. Chief Justice Lucas wrote the opinion for
the court, Justice Kennard and then-Justice George each wrote concurring
and dissenting opinions, and Justice Mosk dissented.68 The majority opinion
erred by rejecting the White compelling public need standard, which the
lower courts had applied to the NCAA and required that it show: “(1) a
‘compelling state interest’ in support of drug testing; and (2) the absence of
any alternative means of accomplishing that interest.”69 After reviewing
the common law right to privacy and the federal constitutional right to
privacy, the court rejected this “rigid” standard in favor of developing a “flexible
and pragmatic approach” that allowed for a contextual assessment of the
competing interests at stake.70
The Lucas opinion adopted a three-part balancing test:


A plaintiff must identify a “legally protected privacy
interest,” judged by whether “established social norms
safeguard a particular type of information.”71 The court
highlighted two classes of legally recognized privacy interests:

68. Hill, 865 P.2d at 669 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 672 (George,
J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 679 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 644.
70. Id. at 646–49 (reviewing common law right to privacy and observing that “the
common law right of privacy is neither absolute nor globally vague, but is carefully
confined to specific sets of interests that must inevitably be weighed in the balance against
competing interests before the right is judicially recognized”); id. at 649–51 (reviewing
federal authority and concluding that “the murky character of federal constitutional privacy
analysis at this stage teaches that privacy interests and accompanying legal standards are
best viewed flexibly and in context”). Even so, the court carved out a narrow category of
cases that warrant a “compelling interest” standard: “Where the case involves an obvious
invasion of an interest fundamental to personal autonomy . . . a ‘compelling interest’ must
be present to overcome the vital privacy interest.” Id. at 653; see also id. (“[O]ur decision
in White signifies only that some aspects of the state constitutional right to privacy—those
implicating obvious government action impacting freedom of expression and association
—are accompanied by a ‘compelling state interest’ standard.”).
71. Id. at 654–55.
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“informational privacy,”which it defined as “interests in
precluding the dissemination or misuse of sensitive and
confidential information;” and “autonomy privacy,” which
encompasses the “interests in making intimate personal
decisions or conducting personal activities without
observation, intrusion, or interference.”72
A plaintiff must show they had a “reasonable expectation
of privacy” under the circumstances.73 Whether a person’s
expectation of privacy is “reasonable” “is an objective
entitlement founded on broadly based and widely accepted
community norms.”74 The court further noted that a person’s
expectation of privacy is affected by “advance notice” of
the conduct and “the presence or absence of opportunities
to consent voluntarily to activities impacting privacy
interests.”75
The claimant must establish a “serious invasion” of their
privacy interest.76 To that end, the court explained: “Actionable
invasions of privacy must be sufficiently serious in their
nature, scope, and actual or potential impact to constitute
an egregious breach of the social norms underlying the
privacy right. Thus, the extent and gravity of the invasion
is an indispensable consideration in assessing an alleged
invasion of privacy.”77

The majority started from the proposition that “[p]rivacy concerns are
not absolute; they must be balanced against other important interests.”78
From there, it explained that “[i]nvasion of a privacy interest is not a
violation of the state constitutional right to privacy if the invasion is
justified by a competing interest.” 79 The court therefore held that “[a]
defendant may prevail in a state constitutional privacy case by negating
any of the three elements just discussed or by pleading and proving, as an
affirmative defense, that the invasion of privacy is justified because it
substantively furthers one or more countervailing interests.”80 A plaintiff,
72. Id. at 654.
73. Id. at 655.
74. Id.; see id. at 648 (“A plaintiff’s expectation of privacy in a specific context
must be objectively reasonable under the circumstances, especially in light of the competing
social interests involved.”).
75. Id. at 655.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 655–56.
80. Id. at 657.
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on the other hand, “may rebut a defendant’s assertion of countervailing
interests by showing there are feasible and effective alternatives to defendant’s
conduct which have a lesser impact on privacy interests.”81 Applying this
framework, the court upheld the drug testing program because the NCAA’s
interests in “safeguarding the integrity of intercollegiate athletic competition”
and “protecting the health and safety of student athletes” justified its
intrusion on student-athletes’ privacy.82
The Hill test is problematic because it places the initial burden of proof
on the individualto establish three threshold elements. Only after that
showing does the burden shift to the invader, and to prevail, the invader
only needs to show that the invasion is justified by a “legitimate”
countervailing interest. As Justice Kennard described it: “Under the majority’s
approach, nongovernmental action that allegedly abridges privacy rights
is not necessarily tested by a compelling interest standard; instead, a less
rigorous but still heightened standard of scrutiny will often be proper.”83
The net effect is to impose the initial burden of proof on a plaintiff to show
a higher-value privacy interest that outweighs the presumptively legitimate
opposing interest.
The primary focus of Justice George’s dispute with the Hill majority
was how the test would work in practice, particularly the majority’s explanation
of potential defenses to a privacy claim. The George opinion is the key to
understanding modern privacy jurisprudence—in a series of decisions
starting shortly after Governor Pete Wilson chose George to serve as
Lucas’s successor in 1996, Chief Justice George worked to rewrite Hill’s
test to conform with his views and shape the current doctrine.84
To Justice George, the problem was the Hill majority’s “abandonment”
of the “compelling interest” standard, which in his view was required by
the clear language of the ballot argument, first adopted in White, and relied

81. Id.; see id. at 656 (“Confronted with a defense based on countervailing interests,
[a] plaintiff may undertake the burden of demonstrating the availability and use of protective
measures, safeguards, and alternatives to defendant’s conduct that would minimize the
intrusion on privacy interests.”).
82. Id. at 657–65. Notably, the court highlighted that the plaintiffs’ privacy interest
was diminished because of the athletic setting and because the students and the university
voluntarily participated with full knowledge of the NCAA’s rules. Id. at 659.
83. Id. at 670 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
84. See infra text accompanying notes 95–100.
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on by the court for the following two decades. 85 George would have
maintained the White test:
[The test] calls upon a court to undertake the familiar constitutional task of
determining the extent or degree to which a defendant’s actions infringe or
intrude upon the plaintiff’s constitutionally protected interest, and of weighing or
balancing that intrusion against the relative importance or compelling nature of
the defendant’s justifications for its actions.86

This, Justice George argued, represents the “traditional constitutional balancing
test . . . for evaluating state constitutional privacy claims.”87
Justice George was concerned that applying the majority’s three-element
approach would inadequately protect privacy interests.88 In his view, the
majority’s test would allow invaders to defeat privacy claims by negating
just one threshold element, never being put to the burden of justifying
their conduct. He explained his concern:
In addition to increasing the plaintiff’s burden in establishing a prima facie
violation of the state constitutional privacy right—i.e., the showing the plaintiff
must make in order to warrant requiring the defendant to proffer some justification
for its actions—the majority’s new legal standard appears to reduce the defendant’s
burden to justify an infringement upon a constitutionally protected privacy interest,
by explicitly declining to embrace the well-established principlethat requires any
such infringement to be justified by a “compelling” interest.89

Indeed, all three elements require a showing by the individual, not the invader.
And none of the three threshold elements are rooted in the ballot language.
Justice George’s compelling interest test, by contrast, would protect
privacy rights by requiring a defendant to justify its conduct any time a
plaintiff asserts a colorable privacy claim. Yet the disagreement on approach
is not entirely a matter of framing. Chief Justice Lucas equated adopting a
“compelling interest” test with strict scrutiny and fretted that it would be
“strict in theory and fatal in fact.”90 Justice George, on the other hand,
viewed his test as flexible and accommodating; “compelling” was simply
equivalent to “important.” 91 He explained, “Properly interpreted, the
‘compelling interest’ standard does not impose impossible or unrealistic
requirements but merely calls for an inquiry that is sensitive to the various

85. Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 673–74 (Cal. 1994)
(George, J., concurring and dissenting).
86. Id. at 674.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 674–78.
89. Id. at 676.
90. Id. at 651 (majority opinion).
91. Id. at 674 (George, J., concurring and dissenting).
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competing interests.” 92 As shown by our empirical study below, his
concerns about the excessive burden of proof on plaintiffs and the low bar
for invaders proved prophetic. As discussed in the next section, Chief
Justice George soon substituted his preferred framework—ostensibly a
compelling need standard that actually is a balancing of equivalent
interests—for the Lucas approach.
B. The Second Error: The George Majority Opinion in Loder
Shortly after Hill, George became Chief Justice in 1996.93 Chief Justice
George hastened to mold the court’s privacy analysis to conform to his
“compelling interest” test. In Loder v. City of Glendale, the California
Supreme Court considered mandatory drug and alcohol testing as a
condition of government employment.94 In another fractured decision that
produced five separate opinions, Chief Justice George’s lead opinion in
Loder substantially reframed the Hill test.
In just three paragraphs, the new Chief Justice effectively imposed the
interest-balancing approach he described in his Hill concurring opinion.
He explained that Hill’s three-part test did not represent a sea change in
the court’s privacy jurisprudence and that the decision should not be read
to narrow the traditional scope of the right to privacy:
The three “elements” set forth in Hill . . . should not be interpreted as establishing
significant new requirements or hurdles that a plaintiff must meet in order to
demonstrate a violation of the right to privacy under the state Constitution —
hurdles that would modify substantially the traditional application of the state
constitutional privacy provision (and diminish the protection provided by that
provision), by authorizing, in a wide variety of circumstances, the rejection of
constitutional challenges to conduct or policies that intrude upon privacy interests
protected by the state constitutional privacy clause, without any consideration of
the legitimacy or importance of a defendant’s reasons for engaging in the
allegedly intrusive conduct and without balancing the interests supporting the
challenged practice against the severity of the intrusion imposed by the practice.95

92. Id. Justice Mosk sided with Justice George. Id. at 683 (Mosk, J., dissenting)
(explaining his “compelling public need” standard and observing that “conduct adversely
affecting, but not abridging, an established right of privacy may be allowed if reasonable”).
93. Chief Justice Malcolm Lucas announced his retirement in October 1995. Maura
Dolan, State Chief Justice Lucas to Retire, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1995, at A1. Governor Pete
Wilson elevated Justice George to Chief Justice, and he was sworn in spring of 1996. Maura
Dolan, Justice George Sworn in as Court’s Chief, L.A. TIMES, May 2, 1996, at A3.
94. See generally Loder v. City of Glendale, 927 P.2d 1200 (Cal. 1997).
95. Id. at 1228–29. Justice George struck this same chord in Hill:
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Interpreting Hill too strictly would be a “radical departure” from the
court’s earlier privacy decisions, which “uniformly hold that when a challenged
practice or conduct intrudes upon a constitutionally protected privacy
interest, the interests or justifications supporting the challenged practice
must be weighed or balanced against the intrusion on privacy imposed by
the practice.”96
Next, Chief Justice George recast Hill as stating only the “threshold
elements” for screening privacy claims, rather than announcing a comprehensive
test for analyzing invasions of privacy:
[T]he three “elements” set forth in Hill properly must be viewed simply as
“threshold elements” that may be utilized to screen out claims that do not involve
a significant intrusion on a privacy interest protected by the state constitutional
privacy provision. These elements do not eliminate the necessity for weighing and
balancing the justification for the conduct in question against the intrusion on
privacy resulting from the conduct in any case that raises a genuine, nontrivial
invasion of a protected privacy interest.97

He concluded: “Hill cannot properly be read . . . to have adopted a
sweeping new rule under which a challenge to conduct that significantly
affects a privacy interest protected by the state Constitution may be rejected
without any consideration of either the legitimacy or strength of the defendant’s
justification for the conduct.”98
Although the Chief Justice does not mention the “compelling interest”
standard from his opinion in Hill by name, his test in Loder is much the
same:


In Hill, George explained that courts should determine “the
extent or degree to which a defendant’s actions infringe or
intrude upon the plaintiff’s constitutionally protected interest,”
and “weigh[] or balanc[e] that intrusion against the relative

In elevating the considerations embodied in the second and third “elements” of
the new cause of action—whether the plaintiff under the circumstances had a
“reasonable expectation of privacy,” and the “seriousness” of the defendant’s
invasion of the plaintiff’s privacy—into independent requirements that always
must be established before a defendant ever is required to provide a justification
for its actions, however, the majority has, in my view, introduced an undesirable
and unfortunate inflexibility into the constitutional analysis that, if faithfully
applied, is likely to bar privacy claims that properly should be permitted to go
forward.
Hill, 865 P.2d at 675 (George, J., concurring and dissenting).
96. Loder, 927 P.2d at 1229 (collecting cases). Again, this echoes a point George
made in Hill. See Hill, 865 P.2d at 673–74 (George, J., concurring and dissenting).
97. Loder, 927 P.2d at 1230.
98. Id. at 1230–31.
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importance or compelling nature of the defendant’s justification
for its actions.”99
In Loder, George wrote that courts must “weigh” and “balance”
the privacy interests at stake against an intruder’s justifications.99

His declaration that this “weighing and balancing” is a “necessity” “in
any case that raises a genuine, nontrivial invasion of a protected privacy
interest” 100 is at odds with the “egregious” language used by the Hill
majority.101 This appears to be calculated to frustrate any attempt by a defendant
to seize on Hill’s “egregiousness” requirement to evade culpability without
providing a justification for their conduct—one of George’s principal
concerns in Hill.102
The Chief Justice’s judicial judo did not go unnoticed. Writing separately
in Loder, Justice Mosk observed: “The lead opinion now declares, in
essence, that the formidable threshold requirements originally set forth in
Hill . . . are no longer part of the state constitutional law of privacy. In its
place the lead opinion would employ a balancing test similar to the one
used under Fourth Amendment analysis . . . .”103 Justice Mosk then made

99 Hill, 865 P.2d at 674 (George, J., concurring and dissenting); see also id. (explaining
that the compelling interest standard “contemplates that a court, in applying the standard,
will employ a balancing test that takes into account the nature and the degree of the intrusion:
the greater the intrusiveness of the defendant’s conduct, the more ‘compelling’ the interest
required in order to justify the intrusion”).
99. Loder, 927 P.2d at 1230.
100. Id. To a similar end, Chief Justice George explained that Hill’s three elements
“permit courts to weed out claims that involve so insignificant or de minimis an intrusion
on a constitutionally protected privacy interest as not even to require an explanation or
justification by the defendant.” Id.
101. Hill, 856 P.2d at 655 (“Actionable invasions of privacy must be sufficiently
serious in their nature, scope, and actual or potential impact to constitute an egregious
breach of the social norms underlying the privacy right.”).
102. Id. at 675 (George, J., concurring and dissenting). In particular, Justice George
argued:
In my view, no justification exists for limiting the reach of the state constitutional
privacy provision only to those breaches of privacy that are “egregious.” . . . I
believe the majority errs in adopting a legal standard that, at least on its face,
purports to afford no protection to an invasion of a constitutionally protected
privacy interest that does not rise to the level of an “egregious” breach of privacy,
even when the defendant is unable to provide any justification for an intrusion
upon the plaintiff’s constitutionally protected privacy interest.
Id. at 676.
103. Loder, 927 P.2d at 1245 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
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explicit what the Chief Justice’s opinion left unsaid: “[T]here no longer
appears to be support for the Hill test by a majority of this court.”104
The Chief Justice’s Loder framework became the standard.105 In Williams
v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court expressly disapproved
White and its progeny, holding that the compelling interest test only applies
when “obvious invasions of interests fundamental to personal autonomy”
are at issue, not in cases involving mere informational privacy.106 Four
days after Williams, in Lewis v. Superior Court, the court held that for the
general, “lesser-interest” balancing test, a privacy interest invasion justified
by a legitimate competing interest is not a constitutional violation, and
those legitimate interests derive from the legally authorized and socially
beneficial activities of government and private entities.107 The result is a
privacy doctrine that combines Chief Justice George’s “compelling interest”
test with Hill’s three elements as the plaintiff’s prima facie showing.108
This is the current Hill–Loder approach. In the next section, we explain
its flaws.
C. Six Reasons the Hill–Loder Analysis Is Wrong
The Lucas opinion in Hill “rather abruptly rejected” a blanket compelling
interest test for cases arising under California’s privacy clause as “overly
rigid” and “not compelled by the ballot argument or by prior case law.”109
That opinion created a novel test for private and governmental intrusions
on the state constitutional right to privacy, drawn from common law privacy
tort principles and federal case law construing the federal constitutional
right to privacy.110 The court rejected the compelling public need test
established by the Proposition 11 ballot pamphlet—and by its own earlier
decisions. The George opinion in Loder reframed the analysis, with the
three Hill elements serving as a prima facie case for plaintiffs to establish
a serious invasion of a protected privacy interest, followed by weighing
the justification for the conduct against the intrusion on privacy.111 In
County of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles County Employer Relations Commission,
the California Supreme Court confirmed that under the Hill–Loder approach,
104. Id.
105. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 811–12 (Cal. 1997) (plurality
opinion ) (quoting Loder, 927 P.2d at 1229); Sheehan v. S.F. 49ers, Ltd., 201 P.3d 472,
477 (Cal. 2009) (quoting Loder, 927 P.2d at 1230).
106. Williams v. Superior Court, 398 P.3d 69, 86–87 (Cal. 2017).
107. Lewis v. Superior Court, 397 P.3d 1011, 1019 (Cal. 2017).
108. See Sheehan, 201 P.3d at 477.
109. JOSEPH R. GRODIN, DARIEN SHANSKE & MICHAEL B. SALERNO, THE CALIFORNIA
STATE CONSTITUTION 53 (2d ed. 2016).
110. See generally Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994).
111. Loder v. City of Glendale, 927 P.2d 1200, 1230 (Cal. 1997).
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an invader has four chances to win: by negating any of the three prima
facie requirements, or by winning the weighing of interests: “[i]n general,
the court should not proceed to balancing unless a satisfactory threshold
showing is made. A defendant is entitled to prevail if it negates any of the
three required elements.”112
That analysis is erroneous. It perverts the electorate’s intent; it relies
on common law tort doctrine; and it conflates the common law and
constitutional remedies. The constitutional privacy right is reduced from a
“fundamental and compelling interest” to the same level as the legitimate
business and governmental interests it is balanced evenly against. That is
because the balancing test is unweighted: the claimed privacy interest and
the claimed legitimate competing interest are of equal value, and a court
need only decide which outweighs the other after a plaintiff makes the
required prima facie showing. A compelling need requirement survives
only when a plaintiff suffers “an obvious invasion of an interest fundamental to
personal autonomy”113—and as our empirical analysis shows, establishing that
claim is even more difficult than a general constitutional privacy violation.
The California Supreme Court should abandon the Hill–Loder analysis
for six reasons:







It rewrote the ballot argument text and ignored clear evidence
of voter intent.
It violated stare decisis.
It was wrong on the law; compelling public need does not
require strict scrutiny.
It conflates the constitutional privacy right with the common
law tort.
The voters did not intend to bifurcate informational and
autonomy privacy.
It attempted to avoid equal protection analysis—and copied
from it anyway.

The Hill–Loder analysis invalidates Proposition 11 and neutralizes the
constitutional privacy right. Even with Chief Justice George’s efforts to
realign the court’s privacy jurisprudence, a fundamental defect remains:
the Hill–Loder approach fails to account for the explicit statements in the

112. County of Los Angeles v. L.A. Cnty. Emp. Rels. Comm’n, 301 P.3d 1102, 1115
(Cal. 2013).
113. Hill, 865 P.2d at 653.
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ballot argument that the right to privacy “should be abridged only when
there is compelling public need.” That interpretive error resulted in an
analysis that negates the electorate’s intent in adopting Proposition 11.
1. It Rewrote the Ballot Text and Ignored Clear Evidence of Voter Intent
Applying the standard California interpretation method shows that the
voters intended Proposition 11 to require a compelling interest test for
violations of the new constitutional privacy right. The Hill–Loder approach
instead frames privacy and public need as equivalent interests and imposes
an evenly balanced weighing of interests. That approach fails to validate
the electorate’s intent to value privacy highly as a compelling interest and
to require an accordingly greater countervailing public need to overcome
the privacy right.
Interpreting initiative constitutional amendments is an exercise in
examining the text, and secondary evidence as needed, to effectuate the
electorate’s intent. When construing a constitutional provision enacted by
the voters, “the intent of the enacting body is the paramount consideration.”114
A court’s “task is simply to interpret and apply the initiative’s language
so as to effectuate the electorate’s intent.”115
To determine intent, “[t]he court turns first to the words themselves for the
answer.” . . . “If the language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for
construction nor is it necessary to resort to indicia of the intent . . . of the voters
(in the case of a provision adopted by the voters).”116

Proposition 11’s text alone does not resolve the inquiry. While article
I, section 1 says that the right to “pursu[e]” and “obtain[]” privacy is
“inalienable,” it says nothing about how to implement that right.117 Yet the
privacy right is no empty aphorism—it is self-executing.118 That silence

114. In re Lance W., 694 P.2d 744, 754 (Cal. 1985); see Kaiser v. Hopkins, 58 P.2d
1278, 1279 (Cal.1936) (“It is a general rule of statutory construction that the courts will
interpret a measure adopted by vote of the people in such manner as to give effect to the
intent of the voters adopting it.”).
115. Robert L. v. Superior Court, 69 P.3d 951, 955 (Cal. 2003) (quoting Hi-Voltage
Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 12 P.3d 1068, 1093 (Cal. 2000)).
116. Delaney v. Superior Court, 789 P.2d 934, 940 (Cal. 1990) (first quoting Brown
v. Kelly Broadcasting Co., 771 P.2d 406, 412 (Cal. 1989); and then quoting Lungren v.
Deukmejian, 755 P.2d 299, 303–04 (1988)).
117. Delving deeply into what, exactly, it means for a right to be “inalienable” is a
tail-chasing exercise outside the scope of this paper. For our purposes, the terse definition
that follows suffices: “A right that cannot be transferred or surrendered; esp., a natural right
such as the right to own property.”Inalienable Right, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014).
118. “The constitutional provision is self-executing; hence, it confers a judicial right
of action on all Californians.” Porten v. Univ. of S.F., 134 Cal. Rptr. 839, 842 (Cal. Ct.
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makes it appropriate to “refer to other indicia of the voters’ intent, particularly
the analyses and arguments contained in the official ballot pamphlet.”119
The ballot arguments are strong evidence that the voters understood and
intended that the individual right to privacy would be subject to a “compelling
public need” standard. The argument in favor of Proposition 11 states that
the right to privacy “should be abridged only when there is compelling
public need.”120 The proponents’ rebuttal likewise stressed, in parallel
terms, that the right to privacy “is limited by ‘compelling public necessity’
and the public’s need to know.”121 Necessity and need in this context are
synonymous. The ballot arguments stated twice that an intrusion on the
right to privacy must be justified by a “compelling public need” or a “compelling
public necessity” and described the privacy right as “compelling.”122
The Hill opinion acknowledged that the ballot arguments seemed to
require a compelling public need standard. Yet Chief Justice Lucas was
overtly concerned that applying what he viewed as strict scrutiny for every
asserted privacy interest would create an “impermissible inflexibility” for
courts.123 He also worried that commerce would be impeded because the
business need to collect data to process transactions would never be compelling
enough. So he identified a single reference to “legitimate needs” in the
proponent’s rebuttal, took it out of context, and used it to support abandoning
the compelling public need standard the court previously adopted in White.124
That amounts to a court substituting its policy view for the electorate’s
judgment to justify lowering the standard of review. Such concerns are
never an appropriate basis for rewriting an initiative.125

App. 1976) (citing White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 234 (Cal. 1975) (noting ballot arguments
showed state constitutional right of privacy was intended to be self-executing and supported
injunctive relief)).
119. People v. Birkett, 980 P.2d 912, 923 (Cal. 1999). The California Supreme Court
has long relied on ballot arguments to determine the voters’ intent and understanding. E.g.,
Carter v. Comm’n on Qualifications of Jud. Appointments, 93 P.2d 140, 144 (Cal. 1939)
(stating arguments presented to voters “may be resorted to as an aid in determining the
intention of the framers of the measure and of the electorate when such aid is necessary”).
120. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 3, at 27.
121. Id. at 28.
122. Id. at 27–28.
123. Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 654 (Cal. 1994).
124. Id. at 645–46.
125. Pro. Eng’rs in Cal. Gov’t v. Kempton, 155 P.3d 226, 243 (Cal. 2007). According to
the California Supreme Court in Professional Engineers in California Government v.
Kempton:
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The Lucas interpretation is erroneous. In the sentence preceding the
reference to legitimate need in the proponent’s rebuttal, the proponent
reaffirmed the “compelling public need” standard by stating that the right
to privacy is limited only by “‘compelling public necessity’ and the public’s
need to know.”126 The rebuttal’s reference to “legitimate need” does not
undermine the compelling need test—“compelling need” appears three
times in the ballot arguments.127 The first instance of “compelling need”
frames the right: “The right of privacy is the right to be left alone. It is
a fundamental and compelling interest.”128 The second instance frames
“compelling need” as a test: “The right should only be abridged when
there is compelling public need.”129
By contrast, “legitimate need” is referenced just once. Read in context,
the phrase is not intended to dilute the compelling public need standard:
“The right to privacy will not destroy the welfare nor undermine any
important government program. It is limited by ‘compelling public necessity’
and the public’s need to know. Proposition 11 will not prevent the
government from collecting any information it legitimately needs.”130 The
quotes on “compelling public necessity”are original, suggesting emphasis,
and that emphasis links to the earlier references to compelling need as the
test. The reference to “a legitimate need” in the following sentence means
genuine and is neither an alternative nor a modifier to the intended
compelling need standard; it only explains that the effect of the compelling
need standard will not prevent all government data collection.
The Hill–Loder approach fails to give effect to the ballot arguments’
clear statement that compelling public need must guide the constitutional
privacy analysis. Ballot measures must be reasonably interpreted, with every
word’s ordinary meaning given significance, even when a court disagrees
with its outcome.131 A reasonable interpretation of Proposition 11 requires
reading the repeated references to compelling public need as the test for
Our role as a reviewing court is to simply ascertain and give effect to the
electorate’s intent guided by the same well-settled principles we employ to give
effect to the Legislature’s intent when we review enactments by that body. We
do not, of course, pass upon the “wisdom, expediency, or policy” of enactments
by the voters any more than we would enactments by the Legislature.
Id. (quoting Cal. Tchr.’s Ass’n v. Governing Bd. of Rialto Unified Sch. Dist., 927 P.2d
1175, 1177 (Cal. 1997)) (citing People v. Rizo, 996 P.2d 27, 30 (Cal. 2000)).
126. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 3, at 28.
127. Id. at 26–28.
128. Id. at 27 (emphasis added).
129. Id. (emphasis added).
130. Id. at 28 (emphasis added).
131. See Dempsey v. Mkt. St. Ry. Co., 142 P.2d 929, 930 (Cal. 1943); see also
Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281,
1300 (Cal. 1978).
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state privacy right claims. Instead, the Lucas opinion took the single
reference to “a legitimate need” out of context, which when read in its
context affirms the “compelling need” test. By writing the “compelling
public need” language out of the constitutional right to privacy, the Hill–
Loder approach substitutes a judicial public policy view for the electorate’s
judgment. That was improper. Courts “do not . . . ‘pass upon the wisdom,
expediency, or policy’ of enactments by the voters any more than [they]
would enactments by the Legislature.”132 Rejecting the compelling public
need standard intended by the voters was error.
2. It Violated Stare Decisis
The Lucas opinion in Hill erred by departing from established precedent.
The first interpretation of Proposition 11 in White affirmed the voter intent
to impose a “compelling interest” standard in privacy cases.133 Yet the
Lucas opinion in Hill held that when “properly analyzed,” its decision in
White “did not establish a blanket ‘compelling interest’ test for all state
constitutional right-to-privacy cases.”134 Instead, Lucas read White to find
only that “no legitimate government interest” was shown. This was a difficult
conclusion to reach, given that White held that the amendment “does require
that the government establish a compelling justification,” and the Proposition
11 ballot pamphlet “makes clear that the amendment” requires “that any
132. Pro. Eng’rs in Cal. Gov’t v. Kempton, 155 P.3d 226, 243 (Cal. 2007) (quoting
Cal. Tchr.’s Ass’n v. Governing Bd. of Rialto Unified Sch. Dist., 927 P.2d 1175, 1177
(Cal. 1997)). In his Hill dissent, Justice Mosk assailed the majority for enacting their
policy choices:
The majority all but abrogate the right of privacy. They plainly consider it “bad
policy.” What of their “policy” assessment? Is the right of privacy “good
policy[?”] Is it “bad policy[?”] It simply does not matter. To be sure, the right
of privacy reflects a choice of policy. But it is a choice that has already been
made—by the people, in their capacity as sovereign, in the California Constitution.
It is therefore a choice that we as judges must accept and respect, regardless of
personal beliefs or predilections. Regrettably, in this case the majority have not
so conducted themselves with regard to the people’s constitutional policy
declaring a right of privacy.
Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 679–80 (Cal. 1994) (Mosk, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted). This calls to mind Justice Mosk’s concurrence a quartercentury earlier in In re Anderson: “As a judge, I am bound to the law as I find it to be and
not as I might fervently wish it to be.” In re Anderson, 447 P.2d 117, 132 (Cal. 1968)
(Mosk, J., concurring).
133. See supra Section III.B.
134. Hill, 865 P.2d at 652.
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such intervention must be justified by a compelling interest.”135 Thus,
Lucas’s opinion in Hill cast aside White, which had been controlling law
for twenty years. This violated the doctrine of stare decisis, “a fundamental
jurisprudential policy that prior applicable precedent usually must be
followed even though the case, if considered anew, might be decided
differently by the current justices.”136
Of course, our argument that the California Supreme Court should abrogate
Hill–Loder and restore the White “compelling public need” standard is
itself subject to a stare decisis rebuttal: Hill–Loder is currently the standard,
and stare decisis should preserve it. Not so: disavowing Hill–Loder would
validate the principle by correcting the error of deviation and restoring
White. It is “well established” that stare decisis is a “flexible” policy that
“permits [the California Supreme Court] to reconsider, and ultimately to
depart from, [its] own prior precedent in an appropriate case.”137 The need
for flexibility in applying stare decisis is especially true when “the error
in the prior opinion is related to a ‘matter of continuing concern’ to the
community at large.”138 Such is the case here. Stare decisis does not “shield
court-created error from correction,”139 and the California Supreme Court
is not “constrained to follow ‘unworkable’ or ‘badly reasoned’ decisions.”140
“This is particularly true in constitutional cases,” where “correction through
legislative action is practically impossible”141 because the California Supreme
Court is the “final arbiter[] of the meaning of the California Constitution.”142
Finally, the stare decisis rebuttal to our argument is not persuasive because
the Hill–Loder analysis itself disregarded stare decisis by deviating from
White. As the court has candidly observed, “[i]f we have construed [the
state constitution] incorrectly, only we can remedy the mistake.”143 The
court got it right the first time in White; by contrast, the current analysis is
badly reasoned and inconsistent with the voters’ intent in adopting Proposition

135. Id.; White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 225, 234 (Cal. 1975).
136. Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos., 758 P.2d 58, 62 (Cal. 1988).
137. Id. at 63.
138. Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 900 P.2d 669, 673 (Cal. 1995) (quoting
People v. Anderson, 742 P.2d 1306, 1331 (Cal. 1987)).
139. Id. at 673 (quoting Cianci v. Superior Court, 710 P.2d 375, 387 (Cal. 1985)).
140. Johnson v. Dep’t of Just., 341 P.3d 1075, 1081 (Cal. 2015) (quoting Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991)); see Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera
Prod. Credit Ass’n, 291 P.3d 316, 322 (Cal. 2013) (acknowledging that the California
Supreme Court is free to reconsider a “poorly reasoned opinion”); County of Los Angeles
v. Faus, 312 P.2d 680, 685 (Cal. 1957) (“Previous decisions should not be followed to the
extent that error may be perpetuated and that wrong may result.”).
141. Johnson, 341 P.3d at 1081 (quoting Payne, 501 U.S. at 828).
142. People v. Birks, 960 P.2d 1073, 1077 (Cal. 1998).
143. Id.
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11. Rather than barring a revision, the doctrine of stare decisis compels
judicial self-correction.
3. Compelling Public Need Does Not Require Strict Scrutiny
The Lucas opinion in Hill erred by conflating the “compelling public
need” requirement with a “compelling interest” standard, and declined to
impose strict scrutiny because Chief Justice Lucas thought it was excessive.144
But the compelling public need in Proposition 11 is not the same as the
“compelling interest” in federal constitutional parlance, and the Privacy
Initiative was not intended to impose strict scrutiny. By proceeding from
those false premises, the Lucas opinion reached a conclusion that was both
wrong and unnecessary.
The Lucas opinion in Hill was poisoned from the start by the Court of
Appeal, which had given the NCAA the burden of proving that its drug
testing program was supported by a “compelling interest” and that the
program represented the “least restrictive alternative” to further its interest.145
This borrowed from White, which endorsed a “compelling governmental
interest” standard but did not explain its contours.146 The lack of explanation
started a daisy chain that led some courts to rely on White for applying
strict scrutiny to constitutional privacy claims.147

144. See Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 651 (Cal. 1994).
145. See id. at 652, 663.
146. White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 234 (Cal. 1975) (“[T]he [ballot] statement makes
clear that the [privacy] amendment does not purport to prohibit all incursion into individual
privacy but rather that any such intervention must be justified by a compelling interest.”);
id. (noting that the allegations raised a “strong suspicion” that the LAPD’s surveillance
activities “may be largely unnecessary for any legitimate, let alone ‘compelling,’ governmental
interest.”); id. at 234–35 (“At trial . . . defendant will be free to contest any of the allegations of
the complaint as well as to designate the compelling governmental interests upon which
they rely for their intrusive conduct.”).
147. See, e.g., People v. Stritzinger, 668 P.2d 738, 742 (Cal. 1983); City of Santa
Barbara v. Adamson, 610 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1980); Loder v. Municipal Court, 553 P.2d
624, 628 (Cal. 1976). The Court of Appeal in Hill drew its “compelling interest” test from
another appellate court decision that had relied on White. See Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n, 273 Cal. Rptr. 402, 410 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (citing Luck v. S. Pac. Transp.
Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618, 629 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)). Luck in turn cited White, 533 P.2d at
234, for the proposition that an “incursion into individual privacy . . . must be justified
by a compelling interest.” Luck, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 629.
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Motivated by his fear that strict scrutiny would “import[] an impermissible
inflexibility into the process of constitutional adjudication” of privacy rights,148
Chief Justice Lucas structured his analysis to reject a compelling interest
and strict scrutiny framework: he dismissed the use of “compelling” when
discussing the ballot argument,149 cited federal law about favoring balancing
tests over rigid strict scrutiny formulations,150 and repurposed California
privacy decisions to explain that they did not support a “compelling interest”
standard.151 This was all unnecessary because it was based on a misreading
of the intended compelling public need test.
Both Justice Mosk and Justice George noted in their separate Hill
opinions that in the privacy context, a compelling need is a point on a sliding
scale where “the greater the intrusiveness of the defendant’s conduct, the
more ‘compelling’ the interest required in order to justify the intrusion.”152
Justice George explained that this does not require strict scrutiny:
Although the standard does require that a defendant have a “compelling,” i.e.,
important, reason for engaging in conduct that intrudes upon a constitutionally
protected privacy interest, . . . a court, in applying the standard, will employ
a balancing test that takes into account the nature and the degree of the intrusion:
the greater the intrusiveness of the defendant’s conduct, the more “compelling”
the interest required in order to justify the intrusion.153

The Hill majority identified the wrong problem: the “inflexibility” lies not
in the test; rather, “the error lies in those courts’ understanding and
application of the compelling interest standard [itself].”154
Chief Justice Lucas was concerned that linking a compelling interest in
the privacy context to that concept’s accepted meaning in the federal
constitutional context would require applying strict scrutiny.155 That concern
148. Hill, 865 P.2d at 654; see id. at 668 (stating, in response to Justices George and
Mosk, that “[w]e [the majority] prefer to avoid the continuing uncertainty and confusion
inherent in the rigid application of a ‘compelling interest’ test to a multi-faceted right to
privacy”). Even if the court had adopted a standard akin to strict scrutiny, there is no
guarantee that requiring such rigorous review would have produced anomalous results.
Empirical analysis suggests that the “strict in theory and fatal in fact” refrain is overblown.
See generally Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis
of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793 (2006).
149. Hill, 865 P.2d at 644–46.
150. Id. at 651.
151. Id. at 652–53.
152. Id. at 674 (George, J., concurring and dissenting); see id. at 688–89 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting) (stating that a plaintiff must prove there was a right of privacy and interference,
which plaintiff has to counterbalance).
153. Id. at 674 (George, J., concurring and dissenting).
154. Id.
155. See id. at 651; see also Brown v. Superior Court, 371 P.3d 223, 232 (Cal. 2016)
(“[W]hen a word or phrase appearing in a statute has a well-established legal meaning, it
will be given that meaning in construing the statute.”).
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was unwarranted because it neither appears that the voters intended that
link, nor is it analytically necessary. The ballot arguments neither referenced
nor endorsed an equal-protection-style strict scrutiny standard. Equating
“compelling public need” to strict scrutiny was inappropriate because the
electorate did not intend the phrase in Proposition 11 in its modern technical
legal sense.156 There is no evidence that the phrases “compelling public
need” or “compelling public necessity” had any special legal meaning before
1972; neither phrase appears with any regularity or particular significance in
California decisions before then.157
A compelling public need is not equivalent to the compelling interest
that requires strict scrutiny. One canon of interpretation holds that when
the voters use legal terms, courts will presume that the voters intended
those terms to have their accepted legal meaning.158 Compelling interest
156. In determining the voters’ intent, courts “look first to the words of the provision
in question, giving them their natural and ordinary meaning, unless it appears they were
used in some technical sense.” Steinhart v. County of Los Angeles, 223 P.3d 57, 71 (Cal.
2010). The Constitution, “unlike the acts of our legislature, owes its whole force and authority
to its ratification by the people; and they judged of it by the meaning apparent on its face
according to the general use of the words employed where they do not appear to have been
used in a legal or technical sense.” Miller v. Dunn, 14 P. 27, 29 (Cal. 1887) (quoting Manly v.
State, 7 Md. 135, 147 (1854)); accord Kaiser v. Hopkins, 58 P.2d 1278, 1279 (Cal. 1936)
(“The words used in a Constitution ‘must be taken in the ordinary and common acceptation,
because they are presumed to have been so understood by the framers and by the people
who adopted it.’” (quoting Miller, 14 P. at 28–29)).
157. Each phrase appears in two California Supreme Court cases. “Compelling
public need” shows up in Fort v. Civil Service Commission of Alameda City, 392 P.2d 385,
389 (Cal. 1964), and Los Angeles Teachers Union v. Los Angeles Board of Education, 455
P.2d 827, 832 (Cal. 1969). “Compelling public necessity” appears in Jones v. City of Los
Angeles, 295 P. 14, 19 (Cal. 1930), and Sunset Amusement Co. v. Board of Police Commissioners,
496 P.2d 840, 850 (Cal. 1972).
158. When an initiative contains terms that have been judicially construed, “the
presumption is almost irresistible” that those terms have been used “in the precise and
technical sense” in which they have been used by the courts. In re Harris, 775 P.2d 1057,
1060 (Cal. 1989) (quoting People v. Weidert, 705 P.2d 380, 385 (Cal. 1985)). In interpreting
voter initiatives, California courts apply the same principles that govern statutory construction.
Horwich v. Superior Court, 980 P.2d 927, 930 (Cal. 1999). The California Supreme Court
commonly applies a presumption that the electorate and the legislature use legal terms in
their legal sense. See, e.g., People v. Bullard, 460 P.3d 262, 267 (Cal. 2020) (stating the
court’s presumption that an undefined term in a voter initiative intended to bear the same
meaning it had at common law); People v. Wells, 911 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Cal. 1996) (“In
construing a statute, unless a contrary intent appears, the court presumes that the Legislature
intended that similar phrases be accorded the same meaning, particularly if the terms have
been construed by judicial decision.” (citations omitted)); State Bd. of Educ. v. Levit, 343
P.2d 8, 18 (Ca.l. 1959) (stating that courts must hold that the electorate meant what it said);
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does have an accepted meaning in federal constitutional doctrine.159 But
that canon does not apply here because the terms used are not identical,
and there is no evidence of voter intent to import federal interpretive
doctrine into a state constitutional principle.
The better method of interpreting “compelling public need” is to give
those words their natural and ordinary meaning, which is more likely to
reflect the voters’ understanding and intent. Justice Mosk did so in Hill,
where he explained:
What is demanded is a “need” on the part of the intruding party that is both
“compelling” and “public.” “Compelling” means that the “need” is one in the
strict sense, denoting something actually required by the intruding party under all
the circumstances and not simply “useful” or “desirable.” “Public,” for its part,
means that the “need” is one that the community at large deems valid and not merely
the intruding party. The “need” in question must extend to the means used as well
as the interests furthered. Otherwise, any interests, so long as they were “compelling,”
would always justify every means, no matter how offensive.160

Justice Mosk was right: his conception of the “compelling public need
standard” provides “in substance and effect, a kind of ‘balancing’ test,”
with a critical caveat: “Its scales . . . do not start out in equipoise, but rather
verge in favor of the right of privacy.”161 That is the best reading of the
Proposition 11 compelling public need standard. It is consistent with the
apparent voter intent, gives effect to the distinct language employed in
Proposition 11, and avoids the fatal-in-fact problem of importing strict
scrutiny. And California’s privacy right is broader than the federal right.162
Linking the standard of review for state privacy claims to an unrelated
federal doctrine would undermine the California provision’s independent
meaning. Reading compelling public need to require strict scrutiny was
error.

Oakland Paving Co. v. Hilton, 11 P. 3, 9 (Cal. 1886) (“[When] technical words or words
of art [are] employed [in a constitutional provision] . . . we must assume that they are used
in their technical meaning.”).
159. See People v. Chatman, 410 P.3d 9, 15 (Cal. 2018).
160. Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 682–83 (Cal. 1994) (Mosk, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted).
161. Id. at 683. Specifically, Justice Mosk proposed a standard that would require a
defendant to show that “any conduct on his part adversely affecting the right of privacy
was justified by a compelling public need if it rose to the level of abridgment or that it was
allowed as reasonable if it did not.” Id. at 688; see Loder v. City of Glendale, 927 P.2d
1200, 1245 (Cal. 1997) (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting) (restating and proposing the
test he offered in Hill).
162. See Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 808–09 (Cal. 1997)
(holding that “the scope and application of the state constitutional right of privacy is broader
and more protective of privacy than the federal constitutional right of privacy,” and citing
related cases).
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4. It Conflates the Constitutional Privacy Right with the
Common Law Tort
The current doctrine is flawed because it conflates a constitutional right
with a common law tort—so much so that there are no material differences
between them. This conflation is illustrated in Hernandez v. Hillsides,
Inc., where the California Supreme Court applied the identical analysis in
determining whether the plaintiff stated a privacy claim under both the
common law and the California Constitution: “The right to privacy in the
California Constitution sets standards similar to the common law tort of
intrusion.”163 The court applied this analysis even though the case concerned
autonomy privacy, which under American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren
should have required a compelling interest showing: “For purposes of this
balancing function—and except in the rare case in which a fundamental
right of personal autonomy is involved—the defendant need not present a
compelling countervailing interest; only ‘general balancing tests are
employed.’”164 The result is that for most privacy claims the scales are
evenly balanced (at a level far below compelling interests) between
constitutional privacy interests and an invader’s competing interest.
That was error because there is no evidence that the voters intended
constitutional privacy to be subsumed under common law tort doctrine.
Instead, the ballot arguments show an intent to establish the state constitutional
doctrine as a novel fundamental right. The ballot argument supporting
Proposition 11 is unequivocal: “This measure, if adopted, would revise the
language of this section to list the right of privacy as one of the inalienable
rights.”165 The ballot argument stated, “The right of privacy is the right to
be left alone. It is a fundamental and compelling interest.”166 Nothing in
the ballot arguments suggests that voters intended to constitutionalize common
law privacy or tort law. Instead, “[t]he elevation of the right to be free from
invasions of privacy to constitutional stature was apparently intended to
be an expansion of the privacy right.” 167 The electorate did not intend
Proposition 11 to blend common law and constitutional privacy. Even the

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., 211 P.3d 1063, 1073 (Cal. 2009).
Id. (quoting Hill, 865 P.2d at 653).
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 3, at 26.
Id. at 27 (emphasis added).
Porten v. Univ. of S.F., 134 Cal. Rptr. 839, 841 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976 ); see
THOMAS ET AL., supra note 27 (“[T]he constitution may provide the plaintiff with a cause
of action where the common law torts are not available.”).
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Lucas opinion in Hill stated that its “reference to the common law as
background to the California constitutional right to privacy is not intended
to suggest that the constitutional right is circumscribed by the common
law tort.”168
The distinction is not an accident: inalienable rights are distinct from
tort laws.169 One right is constitutionally guaranteed, while the others are
either statutory claims or common law claims.170 Conflating a constitutional
right with tort remedies undermines privacy’s status as a fundamental
individual liberty interest and reduces it to a mere civil wrong. Every law
student learns that in the law’s hierarchy, constitutional rights are superior
to statutory and common law claims. Yet under the Hill–Loder framework,
the common law and constitutional rights are equivalent.
Reducing constitutional privacy claims to the status of a tort means that
their remedies coincide. Tort remedies generally provide compensation,
while the default fundamental rights remedy is stopping the intrusive
conduct.171 Plaintiffs also have an array of statutory tools to remedy privacy
invasions.172 And the constitutional right apparently does not include
damages.173 That the respective remedies are different should suggest to
168. Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 648 (Cal. 1994).
169. See id. at 679–81. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
170. See, e.g., Kizer v. County of San Mateo, 806 P.2d 1353, 1356 (Cal. 1991) (“The
Tort Claims Act is a comprehensive statutory scheme that sets forth the liabilities and
immunities of public entities and public employees for torts.”); Rowland v. Christian, 443
P.2d 561, 566–68 (Cal. 1968) (providing a historical analysis of common law torts).
171. Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 961 (Cal. 1982); Kelso, supra note 9, at 394,
396 n.361 (noting that violation of a fundamental right limits actions and that a violation
does not give rise to action for damages absent statutory authorization).
172. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 56 (Deering 2005) (providing remedy for disclosure
of medical information by health care providers); id. § 1708.7 (stalking); id. § 1708.8
(providing remedy for capturing impression of personal or familial activity); id. § 1798
(codifying Information Practices Act of 1977); id. § 1798.100 (codifying California
Consumer Privacy Act); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 630, 637.2, 637.3 (Deering 2008) (prohibiting
wiretapping); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7460 (codifying California Right to Financial Privacy
Act) (Deering 2010); id. § 6218 (banning posting personal information about providers,
employees, volunteers, or patients of reproductive health services facility); id. § 6254.21
(banning posting home address or telephone number of public officials without written
permission); C AL. F IN. CODE § 4050 (Deering 2012) (codifying California Financial
Information Privacy Act); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 99121 (Deering 2013) (barring schools
from forcing students to disclose information about social media use); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §§ 123115, 123125 (Deering 2012) (placing limits on minors’ medical
records, and limits on alcohol and drug abuse records); CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 1810(b)(1),
1808(e) (Deering 2019) (prohibiting selling information from motor vehicle registration
records and disclosing personal information); id. §§ 12800.5, 12800.7(b) (barring disclosing
photographs and other identifying information and disclosing personal information).
173. See Katzberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 58 P.3d 339, 347 n.13 (Cal. 2002)
(“We have no occasion to consider in the present case the circumstances under which the
privacy clause of the state Constitution may support a cause of action for damages.”);
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the courts that the constitutional and common law rights are distinct and
should stay distinct. Providing a single set of remedies for constitutional
and common law claims gives plaintiffs little incentive to pursue
the constitutional claim when the tort is arguably easier to prove—and
provides compensation.174
The greater availability and increased likelihood of success with statutory
claims compared with the constitutional right are strong incentives to further
develop those statutory claims, which explains their comparatively greater
expansion and more frequent use.175 Similarly, the common law privacy
right has seen consistent use by plaintiffs and acceptance by the courts,
from its first use in 1931 176 to a claim being recognized as recently as
2010.177 These disincentives discourage further judicial development of
the constitutional right because the constitutional claims will be made less
often. As shown below, because the constitutional claim is routinely rejected,
plaintiffs will be further discouraged from making the claim. A constitutional
right that cannot be vindicated is a cold comfort, and erroneously conflating
the constitutional and common law privacy rights makes that so.

Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., 211 P.3d 1063, 1072 (Cal. 2009) (citing Katzberg as “suggesting
it is an open question whether the state constitutional privacy provision, which is otherwise
self-executing and serves as the basis for injunctive relief, can also provide direct and sole
support for a damages claim” (citing Katzberg, 58 P.3d at 347 n.13)).
174. While the privacy intrusion tort shares similar elements to the constitutional
claim, the tort claim is easier to prove because it does not require a balancing of interests.
See CACI No. 1800. The privacy intrusion tort also allows for “[d]amages flowing from
an invasion of privacy [to] include an award for mental suffering and anguish.” Id.
Conversely, infringement of constitutional privacy does not necessarily lead to compensation.
Id. (“[I]t is an open question whether the state constitutional privacy provision . . . can also
provide direct and sole support for a damages claim.”).
175. One privacy advocate, Alastair Mactaggart, has twice personally sponsored
statutory privacy initiatives: the 2018 Consumer Right to Privacy Act—withdrawn after
the California legislature passed a revised version of the initiative called the California
Consumer Privacy Act of 2018—and Proposition 24 in 2020, which passed. California
Proposition 24, Consumer Personal Information Law and Agency Initiative (2020) ,
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_24,_Consumer_Personal_
Information_Law_and_Agency_Initiative_(2020) [https://perma.cc/C8SZ-3X2A].
176. Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931) (evaluating a privacy right
cause of action for public disclosure of private facts).
177. Catsouras v. Dep’t of the Cal. Highway Patrol, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 352, 366 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2010) (finding that decedent’s family members had sufficient privacy interest in
accident scene photographs to maintain invasion of privacy action).
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5. It Bifurcates Information and Autonomy
Proposition 11 showed no voter intent to separate privacy claims into
subject-matter categories: it drew no distinction between the importance of
informational and autonomy privacy, nor did it distinguish between the
protections each merited. On the contrary, Proposition 11 described privacy
as a “fundamental and compelling interest.”178 Yet the Hill–Loder approach
distinguishes between information and autonomy: a balancing test applies
to informational claims, and a compelling interest test applies to the most
serious autonomy claims.179 In the same year it decided Loder, the California
Supreme Court held in Lungren that a compelling interest test similar to
strict scrutiny applied to intrusions on the “fundamental” right to personal
autonomy.180 “Where the case involves an obvious invasion of an interest
fundamental to personal autonomy . . . a ‘compelling interest’ must be present
to overcome the vital privacy interest. If, in contrast, the privacy interest
is less central, or in bona fide dispute, general balancing tests are employed.”181
The court at least recognized that the voters intended to require a high bar
for some privacy claims. But Proposition 11 did not distinguish between
informational and autonomy privacy, nor did it suggest that different
privacy claims merited varying standards. On the contrary, the ballot argument
defined all privacy interests as “fundamental and compelling” and required a
countervailing “compelling public need” to justify all invasions. On that
evidence, it is difficult to justify restricting compelling need to only some
claims.
The Lucas opinion in Hill was concerned about the effect on private
business. So were the voters. The ballot arguments were more concerned
with private data collection than government surveillance and emphasized
the threat to informational privacy posed by private businesses.182 That
suggests that adding an express privacy clause to the California Constitution
would provide greater protection against such threats. Fearing the consequences

178. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 3, at 27.
179. See, e.g., Lewis v. Superior Court, 397 P.3d 1011, 1019 (Cal. 2017).
180. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 810 (Cal. 1997).
181. Id. at 810–11 (citing Hill. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 653
(Cal. 1994)).
182. Courts have begun to recognize the increasing significance of informational
privacy in light of technological advancements in the past decades. The Supreme Court
has recognized the significance of the “immense storage capacity” of modern cell phones,
noting that trying to lug around a similar amount of information in physical form would
require dragging along “a trunk of the sort held to require a search warrant.” Riley v.
California, 573 U.S. 373, 393–94 (2014). “The sum of an individual’s private life can be
reconstructed through a thousand photographs labeled with dates, locations, and descriptions;
the same cannot be said of a photograph or two of loved ones tucked into a wallet.” Id. at
394.
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of doing so, the Lucas opinion abandoned White and imposed a new
standard that was the opposite of what the voters intended. That was error.
6. It Attempted to Avoid Equal Protection, Then Circled
Back to Equal Protection
Attempting to avoid borrowing strict scrutiny from federal equal protection
jurisprudence led courts to adopt a rational basis standard, which is also
an equal protection standard. This is illustrated by Sheehan v. The San Francisco
49ers, Ltd., where the California Supreme Court considered whether the
National Football League (NFL)’s policy that all patrons submit to a patdown search before entering a stadium violated the patrons’ constitutional
right to privacy.183 In holding that no violation occurred, the court ruled
that the NFL’s policy need only be “reasonable” and emphasized the
necessity of fact-intensive weighing and balancing.184 The court closed the
opinion with an admonition: “The state constitutional right of privacy does
not grant courts a roving commission to second-guess security decisions at
private entertainment events or to micromanage interactions between
private parties.”185 In equal protection parlance, the court applied rational
basis review.
Sheehan failed to consider that privacy rights apply to private actors as
well as the government. Because privacy interests attach to the person,
they exist wherever the person goes, including to a privately owned sports
stadium.186 Thus, the conclusion in Sheehan that the state constitutional
right of privacy does not apply to private events or interactions is exactly
wrong—the privacy right must apply there, or there is no private-party privacy
right at all.

183. Sheehan v. S.F. 49ers, 201 P.3d 472, 475 (Cal. 2009).
184. Id. at 477–80.
185. Id. at 480. Even so, Sheehan is probably better understood as a simple matter of
consent. Setting aside peer pressure, no one is forced to attend a football game. The case
may be different if, say, Sheehan found herself subjected to a pat-down on the way into
the courthouse after being summoned to jury duty.
186. The Court in Katz v. United States touches upon this concept, stating:
No less than an individual in a business office, in a friend’s apartment, or in a
taxicab, a person in a telephone booth may rely upon the protection of the Fourth
Amendment. One who occupies it, shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll
that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he
utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (footnotes omitted).
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Writing separately, Justice Werdegar cautioned against “extreme deference
to the judgment of private interests” because Proposition 11 “reflects
a recognition that market forces alone may not be sufficient to ensure for
Californians the ability to retain some semblance of privacy in the course
of dealings with government, employers, businesses, and the like.”187 Safety
and security are not trump cards that override all constitutional interests.
Permitting market forces to establish the balance of privacy interests is
inadequate protection for a constitutional right. Worse, it is normative: if
a privacy violation is an industry standard, then a privacy expectation cannot
be reasonable. The constitutional right to privacy instead requires close
scrutiny, not blind faith:
The Legislature passed the Privacy Initiative, the people approved it, and we must
enforce it. In doing so, I am unwilling to substitute for the constitutional right the
people endorsed a reflexive faith in the governmental and private actors they
deemed wanting. Courts are obligated to ensure private entities do, in fact, act
responsibly and reasonably.188

Finally, Justice Werdegar criticized the majority for failing to address
head-on whether the plaintiffs had alleged a sufficiently serious invasion
of privacy.189 In her view, the plaintiffs had done so: “the intrusion at issue,
far from being trivial or insignificant, involves a substantial invasion
of citizens’ interests and expectations of physical autonomy.”190
These issues are not unique to Sheehan. In Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc.,
the director of a residential facility for abused children learned that someone
had used the company’s computers after hours to look at pornographic
websites.191 Hoping to catch the perpetrator, the director installed a motionactivated hidden camera in one of its offices.192 Two female employees
who used the office to change clothes discovered the camera and sued,
alleging both common law and constitutional privacy claims.193 The California
Supreme Court held that the facility had not violated the employees’
187. Sheehan, 201 P.3d at 482 (Werdegar, J., concurring).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 483.
191. Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., 211 P.3d 1063, 1066 (Cal. 2009).
192. Defendants installed the equipment as follows:
[Defendants] installed video recording equipment in plaintiffs’ office and in
a storage room nearby. First, in plaintiffs’ office, they positioned a camera on
the top shelf of a bookcase, among some plants, where it apparently was obscured
from view. They also tucked a motion detector into the lap of a stuffed animal
or toy sitting on a lower shelf of the same bookcase. Second, these devices connected
remotely to a television that [facility employees] moved into the storage room. A
videocassette recorder was built into the unit.
Id. at 1069.
193. Id. at 1067.

158

CARRILLO PAGES FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 59: 119, 2022]

4/6/2022 3:14 PM

California Constitutional Law: Privacy
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

constitutional right to privacy based on the employees’ reduced expectation
of privacy in the workplace,194 the company’s precautions to limit access to
the surveillance equipment, and the recording only happening after regular
work hours.195 There are two primary problems with that balancing of
the employees’ privacy interests against the facility’s justifications for its
intrusion. One problem is the conclusion that because the director had
not “secretly viewed or taped” plaintiffs, there was not a serious intrusion of
privacy: the facility’s “successful effort to avoid capturing plaintiffs on
camera is inconsistent with an egregious breach of social norms.”196 That
misses the point—the presence of covert recording equipment is the intrusion.
The other problem is that the court’s approach minimizes the employees’
privacy interests and is overly deferential to the facility’s justification for
its actions. The court agreed that Hillsides had a legitimate business reason
for its surveillance activities, noting that failing to investigate could have
serious consequences—“the offending conduct posed a risk that the perpetrator
might expose Hillsides to legal liability from various quarters.”197 And
the court rejected the employees’ arguments that the facility could have
employed several simple alternatives that were less invasive of personal
privacy.198 For example, the facility could have installed a visible camera
outside the office to monitor who enters and leaves, or required employees
to enter their credentials before using the computers. The court rejected
these proposed alternatives because they “would not necessarily have
achieved at least one of defendants’ aims”—identifying who was watching
pornography at work.199
That analysis erroneously resembles rational basis review: because the
business behaved reasonably, that offsets any privacy interest. The better
approach is to acknowledge the constitutional violation but give the facility
194. Id. at 1074–79.
195. Id. at 1079–80.
196. Id. at 1080; see id. at 1082 (“Privacy concerns [in this case] are alleviated because
the intrusion was ‘limited’ and no information about plaintiffs was accessed, gathered, or
disclosed.”).
197. Id. at 1081. The court further noted that “accessing pornography on company
computers was inconsistent with Hillsides’ goal to provide a wholesome environment for
the abused children in its care, and to avoid any exposure that might aggravate their
vulnerable state.” Id.
198. Id. at 1082. In doing so, it observed that “defendants are not required to prove
that there were no less intrusive means of accomplishing the legitimate objectives,” at
least in part because it was a “private organization, acting in a situation involving decreased
expectations of privacy.” Id.
199. Id.
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credit for exercising a measure of care by limiting the scope of injunctive
relief or by awarding only nominal damages. As Justice O’Connor said,
“There are no de minimis violations of the Constitution—no constitutional
harms so slight that the courts are obliged to ignore them.”200
Taken together, Sheehan and Hernandez permit courts to engage in
privacy balancing that is overly deferential to an intruder’s justifications
at the expense of individual constitutional privacy rights. These cases
illustrate the Goldilocks problem the Hill–Loder test created: rejecting
strict scrutiny as too restrictive but embracing a too-permissive rationalbasis-style balancing test. Fortunately, there is a solution that is just right:
the “compelling public need” standard addresses this problem by first
valuing the privacy interest highly, then requiring a countervailing need
to justify an invasion. That standard leaves no doubt that when balancing
privacy claims, the scales “verge in favor of the right of privacy.”201
D. Empirical Proof That Hill–Loder Inadequately Protects Privacy
In theory, the California constitutional privacy right provides greater
privacy protection than the narrower federal privacy right.202 In reality,
the current Hill–Loder test reverses that standard. Rather than requiring
the invader to show a compelling need, the existing test requires the plaintiff
to meet a high standard to state a claim. The result is that Hill–Loder effectively
bars constitutional privacy claims. We present the empirical data supporting
that conclusion in the tables below.
Tables 1 and 2 present all published cases in which courts adjudicated
California constitutional privacy claims. Table 1 shows the number of state
and federal privacy claims that courts have upheld or denied from 2009 to
2020.203 Table 2 shows the state privacy claims by state and federal court.
These results show that courts reject 80% of constitutional privacy claims.204
From that, we conclude:

200. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 36–37 (2004) (O’Connor,
J., concurring).
201. Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 683 (Cal. 1994) (Mosk,
J., dissenting).
202. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 808 (Cal. 1997) (“[I]n many
contexts, the scope and application of the state constitutional right of privacy is broader
and more protective of privacy than the federal constitutional right of privacy as interpreted
by the federal courts.”); City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 610 P.2d 436, 440 n.3 (Cal.
1980) (“[T]he federal right of privacy in general appears to be narrower than what the
voters approved in 1972 when they added ‘privacy’ to the California Constitution.”).
203. See infra Table 1.
204. See infra Tables 1, 2.
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The threshold elements prevent plaintiffs from proceeding with
their case even if the intruding party has provided no justification
for the conduct.205
The legitimate need required to counterbalance a privacy interest
is so trivial that defendants will prevail against most claims that
survive the prima facie showing.

TABLE 1: AGGREGATED STATE AND FEDERAL CLAIMS FOR
CALIFORNIA’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY206

.ate & Fede,·al Court: Publi c
lnfonnational Privacy Claim

Autonomy Privacy C laim

38

17

Privacy C laim
Upheld(%)

Privacy C laim
Denied

Privacy C laim
Upheld (%)

Privacy C laim
Denied

8(21%)

30 (79%)

2 (12%)

15 (88%)

State & Fedeml Court: Private

Infonnational Pri vacy Claim

Autonomy Privacy Claim

33

4

Privacy C laim
Upheld(%)

Privacy C laim
Denied

Privacy C laim
Uphel d (%)

Privacy C laim
Denied

8 (24%)

25 (76%)

1 (25%)

3 (75%)

205. Willard v. AT&T Commc’ns of Cal., Inc., 138 Cal. Rptr. 3d 636, 640 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2012) (finding no need to inquire whether appellants had a privacy interest because
they could not establish a reasonable expectation of privacy); Faunce v. Cate, 166 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 61, 63–66 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (finding that a prisoner failed to show that
he had a reasonable expectation of privacy when he met with prison medical staff); In
re Luis F., 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 174, 180–85 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (finding that a student failed
to state the elements for an invasion of privacy, so no balancing was required).
206. Data compiled by and on file with the authors. We separated claims against public
entities from those against private actors.
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TABLE 2: DISAGGREGATED STATE AND FEDERAL CLAIMS FOR
CALIFORNIA’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY207

Court: Public

Federal Court: Public

International
Privacy Claim

Autonomy
Privacy Claim

Informational
Privacy Claim

Autonomy
Privacy Claim

30

14

8

3

Privacy
Claim
Upheld
(%)

Privacy
Claim
Denied

Privacy
Claim
Upheld
(%)

Privacy
Claim
Denied

Privacy
Claim
Upheld
(%)

Privacy
Claim
Denied

Privacy
Claim
pheld
(%)

Privacy
Claim
Denied

5
(17%)

25
(83%)

1
(7%)

13
(93%)

3
(38%)

5
(62%)

1
(33%)

2
(77%)

State Court : Private

207.

162

Federal Court: Private

International
Privacy Claim

Autonomy
Privacy Claim

Informational
Privacy Claim

Autonomy
Privacy Claim

II

2

22

I

Privacy
Claim
Upheld
(%)

Privacy
Claim
Denied

Privacy
Claim
Upheld
(%)

Privacy
Claim
Denied

Privacy
Claim
Upheld
(%)

Privacy
Claim
Denied

Privacy
Claim
pheld
(%)

Privacy
Claim
Denied

2
(18%)

9
(82%)

I
(50%)

I
(50%)

6
(27%)

16
(72%)

0
(0%)

I
(100%)

Data compiled by and on file with the authors.
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Table 1 shows that in 92 state and federal claims, 80% failed. 208
Informational privacy claims constitute 77% of the total failed claims.209
Consistent with the weaker standard that the current analysis applies to
invaders of informational interests, those claims fail at higher rates.
Indeed, if cases disapproved by Williams for applying a compelling interest
test to informational privacy claims are removed, the rejection rate falls to
76%.210 The high failure rate suggests that the interest required to
counterbalance a privacy interest is so low that the informational privacy
claim is fatal in fact against plaintiffs.
For example, People v. Laird upheld a trial court motion denying
expungement of DNA data after a felony was reduced. 211 The court
reasoned that even with redesignation “to an infraction for all purposes,
the state’s legitimate interests in the collection and retention of Laird’s
DNA . . . outweighs any privacy interest Laird may have in expungement.”212
The court repeatedly used “legitimate interests” to characterize the state’s
concern, consistent with the Williams view of informational privacy as a
“lesser interest.”213 This result shows that the legitimate interest test reverses
the electorate’s intended standard because that test only requires a defendant

208. The cases represent claims made to California state courts and federal courts.
State cases comprise reported and unreported Court of Appeal decisions (including an
Appellate Division of the Superior Court), and California Supreme Court decisions.
Similarly, federal cases comprise reported and unreported cases. Because federal district
court cases are reported, unlike state trial court cases, they are included alongside Court
of Appeals decisions. A variety of cases were omitted even when appellants raised
a privacy claim because their procedural posture prevented the court from resolving the
claim. See, e.g., Duarte Nursery, Inc. v. Cal. Grape Rootstock Improvement Comm’n, 191
Cal. Rptr. 3d 776, 786 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) (rejecting plaintiff’s privacy claim because it
was not raised in trial court); Grafilo v. Wolfsohn, 245 Cal. Rptr. 3d 564, 570–74 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2019) (avoiding the privacy right claim by stating that there was not enough evidence
for a subpoena); Strawn v. Morris Polich & Purdy, LLP, 242 Cal. Rptr. 3d 216, 226–29
(Cal. Ct. App. 2019) (stating that a demurrer on appeal does not provide a sufficient factual
record to hold on the privacy claim). This analysis is further complicated by the different
presumptions a court gives to claims depending on the procedural stance of the case.
Compare In re Q.R., 258 Cal. Rptr. 3d 27 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020) (rejecting the privacy claim
after reviewing lower court’s holding on abuse of distraction standard), with Lopez v.
Youngblood, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (approving the privacy claim on a
motion to dismiss standard).
209. See supra Table 1.
210. See supra Table 1.
211. People v. Laird, 238 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313, 316–18 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018).
212. Id. at 325.
213. Id. at 323–25.
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to show a lesser, legitimate interest while a plaintiff must show a fundamental
interest.
Table 2 shows that federal courts denied 71% of privacy claims, while
state courts denied 84% of privacy claims.214 The variance in results flows
from some federal courts not applying Hill–Loder—instead, they evaluate
California constitutional privacy claims using an analysis that is closer to
the intended compelling public need test. For example, in Carter v.
County of Los Angeles a federal court held that a county violated their
workers’ privacy rights by surveilling them with a hidden camera to
investigate possible misconduct.215 The facts resemble those in Hillsides,
where the California Supreme Court rejected a privacy claim; in Carter,
the federal court applied strict scrutiny and upheld a privacy claim.216 The
differing analyses were outcome-determinative: the federal court focused
on the egregiousness of the surveillance, and it did not consider whether
the actions furthered “legitimate interests” as the California court did in
Hillsides.217 The reverse example is equally probative: when federal courts
apply the Hill test, the privacy claim gets denied.218 The takeaway is that
federal courts tend to apply a stricter compelling public need test that better
fits Proposition 11, and plaintiffs are more likely to prevail.
These data suggest that Hill–Loder is a substantive limitation on state
constitutional privacy claims. The number of claims rejected, the apparent
difficulty of the threshold questions, and the particularity of the claims that
were approved support this conclusion. The difference in the federal treatment
of some privacy claims shows the preclusive effect Hill–Loder has on
plaintiffs, and how differences in the analysis affect the rejection rates.
These data show that the state constitutional privacy claim will be upheld
or rejected because of the test, regardless of a claim’s merits. In fact,
federal courts have commented that the standard California courts apply
to state constitutional privacy claims is “a high bar.”219 Our data show that
federal courts uphold California privacy claims more often than California
courts.
Like the strict scrutiny test Hill sought to evade, the existing test is similarly
fatal in fact—to plaintiffs. The Proposition 11 ballot argument is unequivocal
214. See supra Table 2.
215. Carter v. County of Los Angeles, 770 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1045–47, 1054 (C.D. Cal.
2011).
216. Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., 211 P.3d 1063, 1082 (Cal. 2009).
217. Carter, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 1054.
218. See, e.g., Cahen v. Toyota Motor Corp., 147 F. Supp. 3d 955, 973 (N.D. Cal.
2015) (“As pleaded, defendants’ tracking of a vehicle’s driving history, performance, or
location ‘at various times,’ is not categorically the type of sensitive and confidential
information the constitution aims to protect.”).
219. In re Google Assistant Priv. Litig., 457 F. Supp. 3d 797, 830 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
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about requiring a compelling public need to justify privacy invasions.220
Yet the Hill–Loder approach reverses the electorate’s intended burden of
proof: it requires a defendant to show a mere legitimate interest, while
plaintiffs must show a fundamental interest.221 That perverts the usual
judicial approach to initiatives because rather than liberally interpreting the
electorate’s intent to guard its initiative power, the existing privacy analysis
negates the electorate’s will. Considering that autonomy claims are in the
minority, and that the compelling interest test only applies to a subset of
claims within that minority, the result is that the Hill–Loder approach
bars nearly all constitutional privacy claims. That is empirical proof that the
current analysis has maimed Proposition 11 and negated the electorate’s
intent.
V. WE HAVE A BETTER IDEA
Proposition 11 sets both privacy and necessity at the high end of
“compelling” interests, which requires a strong showing of compelling
public need from a defendant to permit invasion. The courts correctly
required a need equivalent to the privacy interest to justify an invasion but
erred by moving both interests to the midpoint on a vertical scale of
interests, reducing both from “compelling” to “legitimate.” This has
several negative effects: it lowers a defendant’s required showing; it
places the burden on a plaintiff to prove a greater interest; and it devalues
privacy from a fundamental right to something ordinary.
That explains why the California Supreme Court has rejected every
privacy claim it considered since Hill.222 This is aptly illustrated in Pioneer
Electronics, Inc. v. Superior Court, where the court dismissed the privacy
claim and emphasized the low bar to dismissal: “[T]rial courts necessarily
have broad discretion to weigh and balance the competing interests.”223
Overall, California courts have rejected over 80% of all such privacy

220. See supra Section III.A.
221. See supra Section IV.
222. See, e.g., Williams v. Superior Court, 398 P.3d 69, 74 (Cal. 2017) (holding that
disclosure of private employee’s contact information to plaintiff in putative class action
under the Private Attorney General Act did not violate California’s privacy clause); County
of Los Angeles v. L.A. Cnty. Emp. Rels. Comm’n, 301 P.3d 1102, 1105 (Cal. 2013) (holding
that disclosure of employees’ contact information to union did not violate California’s privacy
clause).
223. Pioneer Elecs. (USA), Inc. v. Superior Court, 150 P.3d 198, 205 (Cal. 2007).
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claims between 2009 and 2020.224 Abandoning the compelling public
need standard in favor of a general balancing test has arguably resulted in
California’s constitutional privacy clause providing no greater protections
against private intrusions on informational privacy than would have
existed without Proposition 11. California courts now have little incentive
to expand state constitutional privacy protections; while the current doctrine
was developing, new state and federal statutes granted greater privacy
protections, particularly for the informational privacy that the current doctrine
neglects.225 As a result, California’s constitutional privacy clause has
proven to be far less impactful than California voters intended in 1972.
The solution is to abrogate Hill–Loder and restore a compelling public
need test. Concerns about invoking strict scrutiny can be addressed by
adopting the sliding scale interest-balancing Justice Mosk proposed in his
Hill dissent.226 In our proposed approach, constitutional privacy is a compelling
individual liberty interest at the high end of the scale, and an invader must
show an equally compelling public need to justify an invasion. In the following
sections we describe our approach in detail, defend it from anticipated critiques,
and show how it might operate in practice.
A. Abrogate Hill–Loder and Restore the Compelling Public Need Test
Recognizing the “compelling public need” standard would serve two
purposes: it would provide critical guidance to lower courts considering
constitutional privacy claims, and it would guard against the potential for
privacy analysis to devolve into a boundless reasonableness inquiry. We
would adopt Justice Mosk’s definition of compelling public need: “What
is demanded is a ‘need’ on the part of the intruding party that is both
‘compelling’ and ‘public.’”227 That is consistent with the ballot argument.
224. Rodolfo Rivera Aquino, California’s Constitutional Privacy Guarantee Needs a
Reset, SCOCABLOG (Apr. 9, 2021), http://scocablog.com/californias-constitutional-privacyguarantee-needs-a-reset/ [https://perma.cc/WH6W-6VTN]. One exception is an opinion
published while we drafted this article. In a 4–3 decision, rare for the typically unified modern
court, the California Supreme Court held in Mathews v. Becerra, 455 P.3d 277, 281 (Cal.
2019), “that plaintiffs have asserted a cognizable privacy interest under the California
Constitution and that their complaint survives demurrer.” The Chief Justice dissented, and
with two justices concurring, would have held that the claim did not survive a demurrer—
where all facts in the complaint are assumed true—because in her view those facts did not
“establish that the challenged conduct infringes upon a reasonable expectation of privacy.”
Id. at 300 (Cantil-Sakauye, C.J., dissenting).
225. See LOTHAR DETERMANN, CALIFORNIA PRIVACY LAW: PRACTICAL GUIDE AND
COMMENTARY, U.S. FEDERAL AND CALIFORNIA LAW 1–4 (4th ed. 2020) for a list of and
commentary on federal and California privacy statutes.
226. Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 682–83 (Cal. 1994) (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
227. Id.
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It is also consistent with White, which describes the standard for upholding
a constitutional privacy claim as “a strong suspicion” that the material
“may be largely unnecessary for any legitimate, let alone ‘compelling,’
governmental interest.”228
Replacing Hill–Loder with Justice Mosk’s position is justified because
his position was founded on the Privacy Initiative’s ballot materials and
reflects the public’s understanding of the constitutional right to privacy
when it was enacted. Fidelity to voter intent is the central concern when
interpreting an initiative constitutional amendment: when “[f]aced with a
constitutional amendment adopted by initiative, . . . we are obliged to set
aside our personal philosophies and to give effect to the expression of popular
will, as best we can ascertain it, within the framework of overriding constitutional
guarantees.”229 Justice Mosk’s position expressly relies on that obligation:
“This is not a case about the ‘policy’ this court may think it best to formulate
and implement with regard to privacy. Rather, it is a case about the
California Constitution and the role of the judiciary within the order it
establishes.”230
As we did here, Justice Mosk analyzed the Privacy Initiative’s text and
the ballot arguments to determine intent.231 From these sources, Justice
Mosk derived eight guiding principles:
1. “[T]he status of the right of privacy is variously declared to
be ‘fundamental,’ ‘ compelling,’ and ‘basic,’” from which
“[i]t follows that the right of privacy ‘should be abridged
only when there is compelling public need.’”232
2. “[T]he source of the right of privacy is ‘our traditional
freedoms’ and our ‘American heritage’ . . . as reflected in the
common law, federal and state statutes, and federal and state
constitutional law generally, including . . . the guaranties against
unreasonable searches and seizures in the Fourth Amendment
to the [U.S.] Constitution and article I, section 13 of the
California Constitution.”233
228. White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 234 (Cal. 1975).
229. In re Lance W., 694 P.2d 744, 747 (Cal. 1985); see Hodges v. Superior Court,
980 P.2d 433, 437 (Cal. 1999) (“In the case of a voters’ initiative statute . . . we may not
properly interpret the measure in a way that the electorate did not contemplate: the voters
should get what they enacted, not more and not less.”).
230. Hill, 865 P.2d 633, 679 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
231. Id. at 680–82.
232. Id. at 682 (quoting PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 3, at 27).
233. Id. at 684.
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3. “[T]he definition of the right of privacy is simply the ‘right
to be left alone.’”234
4. The substance of the right of privacy has three major aspects:
informational privacy, which is “a protectible interest against
an intruding party’s obtaining and/or publishing of private
information belonging to the party intruded upon;” autonomy
privacy, which is “a protectible interest against an intruding
party’s interference with private conduct by the party
intruded upon;” and privacy “properly so called,” which is
“a protectible interest against an intruding party’s very act
of invading the solitude of the party intruded upon.” Each
of these interests “is of equal stature.”235
5. “[T]he scope of the right of privacy is broad.”236
6. “[T]he nature of the right of privacy is dynamic.”237
7. “[T]he coverage of the right of privacy is unlimited,” in that
“it reaches both governmental and nongovernmental actors.
Intrusion is what matters, not the identity of the intruder.”238
8. “[T]he character of the right of privacy is justiciable,” meaning
that courts can enforce it and remedy violations.239
From these principles, Justice Mosk proposed a straightforward test that
gave meaning to the “compelling public need” standard enacted by the
voters:
Recall that the right of privacy may be abridged only when there is compelling
public need; conduct adversely affecting, but not abridging, an established right
of privacy may be allowed if reasonable; conduct bearing on a fictive “right of
privacy” is not subject to any scrutiny at all.
Accordingly, the plaintiff must plead that he has a right of privacy and that it was
interfered with by the defendant. The defendant may then plead, beyond simple
denial, that any conduct on his part adversely affecting the right of privacy was
justified by a compelling public need if it rose to the level of abridgment or that it
was allowed as reasonable if it did not. The plaintiff must prove his right of
privacy and the defendant’s interference therewith by shouldering the generally
applicable burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. The defendant
must prove under the same burden the justification or allowance of his conduct.240

234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
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Justice Mosk’s application of this proposed standard to the NCAA’s
drug-testing program in Hill provides further guidance on how it should
work in practice. Two key questions refine the mode of analysis:




Parsing how compelling a public need may be is a dual inquiry.
A “compelling public need” must be “a ‘need’ on the part
of the intruding party that is both ‘compelling’ and ‘public.’”241
A need is compelling “if it is actually required by the
intruding party under all the circumstances,” and a need is
public “if it is deemed valid by the community at large.”242
Thus, the standard includes a subjective element and an
objective community standards element.
The other question is whether the privacy intrusion is tailored
to the interest it purports to serve: the invader’s claimed
need “must extend to the means used as well as the
interestsfurthered.”243 This tailoring is critical: “Otherwise, any
interests, so long as they were ‘compelling,’ would always
justify every means, no matter how offensive.”244

Considering the ballot materials, contemporary intent evidence, and
contemporary judicial interpretation, we conclude that Justice Mosk was
right. Our independent analysis of those materials, informed by our empirical
analysis of how Hill–Loder operates in practice, compels us to agree with
his position. Beyond realigning California privacy law with the voters’

241. Id. at 694.
242. Id.; see id. at 683 (“‘Public,’ for its part, means that the ‘need’ is one that the
community at large deems valid and not merely the intruding party.”); id. (reviewing ballot
argument and explaining that that “a ‘legitimate need’ is one that is actually required
by the intruding party— it is a need—and is deemed valid by the community at large—it
is legitimate”).
243. Id. at 694.
244. Id. at 683. Guidance for the tailoring inquiry may be found in the U.S. Supreme
Court’s cases applying heightened, but not strict, scrutiny when evaluating the means-end
fit in the First Amendment context. The Court in McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 218
(2014), expressed the necessity of such tailoring:
Even when the Court is not applying strict scrutiny, we still require a fit that is
not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single
best disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the interest served, . . .
that employs not necessarily the least restrictive means but . . . a means narrowly
tailored to achieve the desired objective.
The Court further discussed the tailoring demanded by both exacting and strict scrutiny in
Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373, 2383–85 (2021).
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intent and understanding, several practical reasons motivate revisiting
Hill–Loder.
First, the steady advance of technology that motivated the Privacy Initiative
in 1972 has continued unabated over the ensuing fifty years, placing
Californians’ privacy interests at greater risk of intrusion. For example,
in today’s terms, what if the NCAA drug-testing program employed mouth
swabs, reasoning that it is less intrusive than urinalysis? Compulsory buccal
swabs would provide the NCAA, the school, and others with access to
highly sensitive personal information: such swabs can be used to compile
a student’s complete genetic profile.245 Or perhaps Stanford University
requires its student athletes to wear a school-issued activity tracker during
their athletic season. Many wearable devices would enable the school to
monitor, track, and compile a host of information, including precise location
information, heart rate, sleep data, and oxygen saturation.
Next, adopting a Mosk-style compelling public need standard would
better protect Californians’ privacy rights. Our Hill–Loder empirical study
above shows that the existing doctrine has drifted from the voter’s intent.
The result has been to undermine the privacy rights that the voters sought
to secure. In Hillsides, for example, the existing analysis permitted a ruling
that an employer can covertly record employees in a private office.246 The
Mosk analysis would have started by recognizing that the employees’
right to privacy was invaded by being surreptitiously recorded. The
compelling public need analysis then turns to a series of nested questions
that ensure that the plaintiffs’ privacy claims are fully considered. At the
first step, the burden would be on the employer to either prove that the
abridgement “was justified by a compelling public need” or establish that the
conduct was “reasonable” because it only “adversely affected” the employees’
right to privacy.
Assuming there was an abridgement, then the inquiry turns to whether
there was a “compelling” need for the surveillance. Was it “actually required”
“under all the circumstances?” If so, was the need “public”—was it “deemed

245. See, e.g., Eric Ravenscraft, How to Protect Your DNA Data Before and After
Taking an At-Home Test, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/
06/12/smarter-living/how-to-protect-your-dna-data.html [https://perma.cc/U5H7-4FUC];
see also Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 446 and 465 (2013) (holding that buccal swab to
obtain arrestee’s DNA sample was a reasonable search for Fourth Amendment purposes).
Indeed, some research suggests that urine samples can now be used as a source to obtain
DNA. Souvick Ghatak, Rajendra Bose Muthukumaran & Senthil Kumar Nachimuthu, A
Simple Method of Genomic DNA Extraction from Human Samples for PCR-RFLP Analysis, 24
J. BIOMOLECULAR TECHS. 224, 224–25 (2013); Latifa El Bali et al., Comparative Study of
Seven Commercial Kits for Human DNA Extraction from Urine Samples Suitable for DNA
Biomarker-Based Public Health Studies, 25 J. BIOMOLECULAR TECHS. 96, 96 (2014).
246. Hernandez v. Hillsides, 211 P.3d 1063, 1082 (Cal. 2009).
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valid by the community at large?” This requires the defendant to particularize
its interest: to show that it had a compelling interest in preventing staff
from viewing pornography (particularly in a children’s residential facility)
and that this interest is recognized by the community. The final step is a
bulwark against a freeform reasonableness test: the defendant must justify
its action by showing that the means used are tailored to the underlying
interest. Was the privacy intrusion “actually required” under the circumstances?
Given the obvious less-invasive alternatives that were available, the
employer would struggle to show that was the case. The compelling public
need test thus vindicates the plaintiffs’ privacy interests while accounting
for all of the underlying circumstances.
Finally, adopting the compelling public need standard would also correct a
critical flaw in Sheehan, which placed significant weight on the NFL
and the 49ers being private entities.247 As the ballot materials and Justice
Mosk made clear, “Intrusion is what matters, not the identity of the
intruder.”248 The ballot materials provide that “the coverage of the right
of privacy is unlimited,” and “it reaches both governmental and
nongovernmental actors.”249 Still, we concede that the ultimate result in
Sheehan would likely be the same under our proposed compelling public
need test. While the 49ers would bear the burden of proving their conduct
was justified, we expect they would argue that pat-down inspections only
“adversely affect” ticketholders’ right to privacy such that their conduct
should be allowed as “reasonable.” Alternatively, the team would argue
that such inspections were required under all the circumstances to protect
the safety of spectators, and that spectator safety is deemed valid by the
community at large.
The ballot materials cannot reasonably be read to require a weaker
standard than the compelling public need test Justice Mosk proposed. We
endorse that test here because we reach the same conclusion from reviewing
those materials and our empirical study of the right-devaluing results of
the Hill–Loder analysis.

247. Sheehan v. S.F. 49ers, Ltd., 201 P.3d 472, 479–80 (Cal. 2009).
248. Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 687 (Cal. 1994) (Mosk,
J., dissenting).
249. Id.
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B. Constitutional Privacy Supplements Statutory Remedies
Some might ask why a more robust constitutional privacy, even if it
would better reflect voters’ intent in passing Proposition 11, is necessary
at all when California has an array of privacy statutes that protect similar
interests. California does have several statutory schemes that provide
robust privacy protections to consumers and citizens, including some laws
with civil and criminal penalties. 250 Yet as multiple examples below
reveal, those statutes all limit their scope to a specific privacy issue and
apply only to particular contexts or particular people. A generalized
constitutional privacy right has no such limitations. Although statutory
damages and other monetary remedies remain an attractive litigation
option when a statutory claim applies, robust constitutional privacy can
be a backstop protection for privacy interests no matter the context,
whether as an alternative to a statutory claim or where no statutory claim
would fit. An effective constitutional privacy claim can also vindicate
privacy rights where a monetary award is not the sole, or even the primary,
interest for a plaintiff. This constitutional privacy protection will remain
resilient in the face of an ever-shifting statutory landscape where the
legislature or the voters tinker with statutory privacy protections.251
For example, the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (CCPA)
applies only to certain businesses.252 Under the CCPA, a “business” is an
entity that, among other requirements, “collects consumers’ personal
information, or on the behalf of which such information is collected and
that alone, or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of
the processing of consumers’ personal information.”253 Thresholds for the
volume of business conducted ensure that smaller businesses do not face
the burdens of complying with the CCPA. 254 But a small business not
subject to the CCPA could still violate a consumer’s privacy.
250. See sources cited supra note 172; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 502 (Deering
2021) (codifying California’s Computer Data Access and Fraud Act, or “CDAFA”); CAL.
CIV. CODE §§ 56–56.37 (Deering 2021) (codifying the “Confidentiality of Medical Information
Act” or “CMIA”).
251. Compare, for example, the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, with the
same statutory scheme amended nearly two years later by Proposition 24 on the November
2020 ballot, known as the California Privacy Rights Act of 2020, which will become
operative on January 1, 2023. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–1798.199 (Deering 2021)
(codifying the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018); California Privacy Rights Act
of 2020, Assemb. B. 1490, 2021–22 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2021) (codified in part at CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1798.199.10).
252. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(c) (Deering 2021).
253. Id. § 1798.140(d)(1).
254. Those thresholds include the following: having annual gross revenues in excess
of $25 million; annually buying, receiving for the business’s commercial purposes, selling
or sharing for commercial purposes, personal information of 50,000 or more consumers,
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Another example of a statutory scheme that addresses specific privacy
interests in a particular context is California’s Confidentiality of Medical
Information Act (CMIA).255 The CMIA obligates a provider of health
care, health care service plan, pharmaceutical company, or contractor to
maintain “medical information . . . in a manner that preserves the
confidentiality of the information contained therein,” and any such party
“who negligently . . . maintains, preserves, stores, abandons, destroys,
or disposes of medical information” is subject to specified remedies.256
Those remedies include nominal damages of $1,000 and actual damages
from “any person or entity that has negligently released confidential
information or records.”257 Like the CCPA and CPRA, this statute will
apply only to certain individuals or entities, such as a health care service
plan, a health care provider, a pharmaceutical company, or certain contractors
as defined by the statute.258 Violating the CMIA requires “an unauthorized,
unexcused disclosure of privileged medical information.”259 This privileged
information, or “medical information,” must be “individually identifiable
information” about “a patient’s medical history, mental or physical condition,
or treatment.”260 Thus, the theft of a hospital index containing personal
identifying information—including names, medical record numbers, dates of
birth, and the last four digits of a person’s Social Security number—would
not support a CMIA claim unless that index also included information that
fell under the statutory definition for medical information.261
When examining the limits under statutes such as the CCPA and CMIA,
including to whom the statutes do or do not apply and the activity that

households, or devices; or deriving 50% or more of annual revenues from selling consumer’s
personal information. Id. § 1798.140(d)(1)(A)–(C).
255. Id. §§ 56.10–56.37.
256. Id. § 56.101(a).
257. The Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (CMIA), CONSUMER FED’N OF
CAL., https://consumercal.org/about-cfc/cfc-education-foundation/cfceducation-foundation
your-medical-privacy-rights/confidentiality-of-medical-information-act/ [https://perma.cc/
AT6J-MVFT]; CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.36(b) (Deering 2021).
258. CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.10 (Deering 2021); id. § 56.05(d), (g), (l), (m); see id. §
56.06. The CMIA also requires employers who receive medical information to safeguard
that information and prohibits them from disclosing medical information without employee
authorization, though there are exceptions. See id. §§ 56.20–56.245.
259. Sutter Health v. Superior Court, 174 Cal. Rptr. 3d 653, 660 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014)
(quoting Brown v. Mortensen, 253 P.3d 522, 533 (Cal. 2011)).
260. CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.05(j) (Deering 2021).
261. Eisenhower Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 172 Cal. Rptr. 3d 165, 166, 168 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2014).
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falls under the statutes, it is clear that there are several possible privacy
interest violations that those statutes would not remedy.262 Thus, a robust
constitutional privacy protection has an important place in safeguarding
citizens’ privacy interests against those violations, especially where a
statute will not provide that protection because a business is a particular
size or the violation does not involve “medical information.” The compelling
public need test we endorse will permit appropriate scrutiny of potential
privacy violations without requiring a wronged citizen to jump through the
hoops of a particular statute. 263 Even if a robust constitutional privacy
doctrine still, in most cases, falls under one of California’s privacy statutes,
there is value in a baseline constitutional value and a default constitutional
claim with less possible exposure for a defendant. That scenario permits
plaintiffs to vindicate their privacy interests if no statutory claim is available.
A reliable constitutional claim balances the legislature’s ability to
modify statutory schemes. Having robust constitutional protections—as
intended originally by the voters who approved the Privacy Initiative—is
an important backstop protection for privacy interests regardless of
what statutory changes occur in the future.264 For example, there are recent
changes to the CCPA that in some ways expand privacy protections,265 but
the amended statute in other ways narrows the subset of businesses to

262. Indeed, courts have recognized this gap between the CCPA and California’s
constitutional right of privacy. “[T]he CCPA is a statute that is focused on particular practices;
namely, it seeks to address the sale of PI [—personal information—] and the disclosure of
PI for business purposes.” Kaupelis v. Harbor Freight Tools USA, Inc., No. SACV 191203 JVS(DFMx), 2020 WL 7383355, at *2 (C.D. Cal., Sept. 28, 2020).
263. The appeal of large amounts of statutory damages possible in class action
lawsuits involving large data breaches will still encourage litigants to pursue statutory
claims even if an underlying constitutional privacy claim is easier to prove. See, e.g., In
re Yahoo! Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 16-MD-02752-LHK, 2020 WL
4212811, at *5, 10, 12 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 2020), appeal dismissed, No. 20-17438, 2021
WL 2451242 (9th Cir. Feb. 16, 2021); In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litig., 327 F.R.D.
299, 318 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (involving a settlement fund of $115 million); see also Holly S.
Hosford, Avoiding Annihilation: Why Trial Judges Should Refuse to Certify a FACTA Class
Action for Statutory Damages Where the Recovery Would Likely Leave the Defendant Facing
Imminent Insolvency, 81 MISS. L.J. 1941, 1943 (2012) (discussing large amounts of
statutory damages awards stemming from large class sizes); Sheila B. Scheuerman, Due
Process Forgotten: The Problem of Statutory Damages and Class Actions, 74 MO. L. REV.
103, 106 (2009) (discussing statutory damages and class actions).
264. See supra note 252 (noting that the CPRA amends and expands the CCPA).
265. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(ah)(1) (Deering 2021) (adding a definition for
sharing personal information, to be operative January 1, 2023). Compare, e.g., id.
§ 1798.140(c)(1)(C), with id. § 1798.140(d)(1)(C) (expanding definition of business to
include businesses that derive 50% or more of annual revenues from selling “or sharing”
consumers’ personal information, to be operative January 1, 2023). These changes will expand
application of the statutory scheme to businesses that profit from sharing, but not
necessarily selling, personal information.
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which it applies. 266 A constitutional privacy claim is a constant floor
while the legislature and voters further refine statutory schemes in an
effort to maximize statutory goals while minimizing undesired costs and
burdens.
Finally, there may be concern about a more robust constitutional privacy
doctrine inspiring plaintiffs to bring California constitutional privacy
claims. That’s unlikely: plaintiffs already raise California constitutional
law and common law privacy claims, along with statutory privacy claims,
on a regular basis.267 As explained in the next section, our proposed compelling
public need analysis will not displace statutory schemes because the California
constitutional privacy claim has only limited remedies.268 California’s
privacy statutes and a robust, accurate view of the California constitutional
right to privacy can coexist and complement each other.269

266. Compare, e.g., id. § 1798.140(c)(1)(B) (Deering 2021), with id. § 1798.140(d)(1)(B)
(expanding threshold from 50,000 consumers to 100,000 consumers for a business to qualify
under the statute, to be operative January 1, 2023).
267. See, e.g., McCoy v. Alphabet, Inc., No. 20-CV-05427-SVK, 2021 WL 405816,
at *6–8, 13–14 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2021) (considering allegations of constitutional and
common law privacy claims as well as allegations of violations of the CCPA and
California’s Invasion of Privacy Act); Cohorst v. BRE Props., Inc., No. 10cv2666JM
(BGS), 2011 WL 3475274, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2011) (noting the “essence of
Plaintiffs’ claim” as an alleged violation of “California’s constitutional right to privacy and the
Privacy Act . . . by monitoring, recording, or eavesdropping on telephonic conversations”
and seeking statutory damages available under California Penal Code section 637.2); Del
Campo v. Mealing, No. C 01-21151 JW, 2011 WL 7479162, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 20, 2011)
(considering claim for actual and statutory damages under the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act as well as liability for violation of California constitutional privacy rights).
268. See, e.g., Katzberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 58 P.3d 339, 348–50 (Cal. 2002)
(citing numerous cases in which California courts refused to extend remedies for violations
of the California constitution to money damages).
269. This complementary relationship between statutory privacy claims and constitutional
privacy claims also is unlikely to create a flood of litigation in federal courts. Aside from
the reality that plaintiffs already plead these claims together, see McCoy, 2021 WL
405816, at *6, 8, 13, the Supreme Court’s recent holding in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,
141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021), reduces the likelihood of an onslaught of privacy claims. There,
the Court required a showing of concrete harm to establish standing to sue in federal court
even where a statute authorizes statutory damages. TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2214. Thus,
a requirement of concrete harm will ensure that both constitutional privacy claims, which do
not include the possibility of statutory damages, and statutory privacy claims , many of
which do permit statutory damages, do not flood federal courts.
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C. Litigants Have Powerful Tools to Vindicate Their Privacy Rights
Remedies for constitutional privacy violations likely do not extend
beyond nominal damages and declaratory relief. This is beneficial because
it permits courts to vindicate the constitutional right while not displacing
the statutory remedies or creating unwarranted incentives for frivolous
new claims. As the ballot materials note, although the right is “legal and
enforceable” in the courts “for every Californian,”270 whether constitutional
privacy claims have a damages remedy remains an open question.271 Yet the
absence of a damages remedy does not mean that a plaintiff lacks a
meaningful remedy. The California Supreme Court has recognized on
multiple occasions that other fundamental rights secured by article I can
be enforced through declaratory or injunctive relief, or by seeking a writ
of mandate.272 Thus, plaintiffs have several options to vindicate their
constitutional privacy rights.
Even without the threat of damages, plaintiffs have an important tool:
the potential for recovering private attorney general fees under California
Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.273 The California Supreme Court
has explained:
270. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 3, at 26.
271. See, e.g., Katzberg, 58 P.3d at 359.
272. Degrassi v. Cook, 58 P.3d 360, 363 (Cal. 2002) (acknowledging that the free
speech clause of article I, section 2(a) supports an action for declaratory relief or
injunction); Katzberg, 58 P.3d at 342–43 (recognizing that the due process clause under
art. I, section 7(a) is enforceable by declaratory relief or injunction). The court’s analysis
in each of these cases suggests that it would most likely find that an action for damages is
not available under a constitutional tort theory. For example, in Degrassi, the court analyzed
ballot materials and found “nothing in these materials to suggest that the voters considered,
much less intended . . . to create or to foreclose, a damages remedy . . . .” Degrassi, 58
P.3d at 364. Similarly, the ballot materials for Proposition 11 in 1972 indicate no intent to
create a damages remedy. See Katzberg, 58 P.3d at 343, 356; see also id. at 351–52
(discussing ballot materials). This lack of availability of damages also alleviates concerns
about privacy plaintiffs relying on a California constitutional privacy claim and nominal
damages request to establish Article III standing in federal court. See Uzuegbunam v.
Preczewski, 141 S. Ct. 792, 796–97 (2021) (upholding standing on the basis of nominal
damages for a First Amendment claim); see also Katzberg, 58 P.3d at 343–44, 351–
52 (discussing Bivens federal constitutional claim and still concluding no damages remedy
for state constitutional claim); Degrassi, 58 P.3d at 362 (noting case originally involved a
damages claim under title 42 of the United States Code section 1983, a statute addressing
state actors violating federal constitutional rights, along with the separate state constitutional claim
for which the court declined to recognize a damages remedy). Privacy plaintiffs in this
context will still need to satisfy the requirements of Article III standing if seeking relief in
federal court. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
273. Under section 1021.5 of the California Code of Civil Procedure,
[A] court may award attorneys’ fees to a successful party . . . in any action which
has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest
if: (a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred
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[T]he private attorney general doctrine ‘rests upon the recognition that privately
initiated lawsuits are often essential to the effectuation of the fundamental public
policies embodied in constitutional or statutory provisions, and that, without some
mechanism authorizing the award of attorney fees, private actions to enforce such
important public policies will as a practical matter frequently be infeasible.’ Thus,
the fundamental objective of the doctrine is to encourage suits enforcing important
public policies by providing substantial attorney fees to successful litigants in
such cases.274

California courts have long recognized that litigation that vindicates
constitutional rights satisfies the baseline criteria for private attorney
general fees.275 The California Supreme Court has also cautioned that a
restrictive approach to fee awards “would allow vital constitutional
principles to become mere theoretical pronouncements of little practical
value to ordinary citizens who cannot afford the price of vindicating those
rights.”276 Enforcing individual constitutional rights protects society as a
whole, which justifies a fee award.277
The availability of meaningful remedies, coupled with the potential recovery
of private attorney general fees, complements the available common law
on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial
burden of private enforcement . . . are such as to make the award appropriate,
and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery,
if any.
CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1021.5 (Deering 2021).
274. Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 101 P.3d 140, 147 (Cal. 2004) (quoting Maria
P. v. Riles, 743 P.2d 932, 935 (Cal. 1987)).
275. See, e.g., Woodland Hills Residents Ass’n, Inc. v. City Council, 593 P.2d 200,
212 (Cal. 1979) (recognizing that the private attorney general doctrine may justify fees
through “the effectuation of a fundamental constitutional or statutory policy”); Press v.
Lucky Stores, Inc., 667 P.2d 704, 708 (Cal. 1983); see, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Santa
Barbara, Inc. v. Aakhus, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 510, 515 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (awarding fees to
successful plaintiff in a constitutional privacy case and observing that the enforcement of
“fundamental constitutional rights . . . benefits the entire public”); County of San Luis
Obispo v. Abalone All., 223 Cal. Rptr. 846, 856–57 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (considering
section 1021.5 fees in litigation over the “fundamental right of protest”); City of Fresno
v. Press Commc’ns, Inc., 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 456, 463 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (considering
freedom of speech and press); Best v. Cal. Apprenticeship Council, 240 Cal. Rptr. 1, 13
(Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (considering constitutional right to religious accommodation);
Sokolow v. County of San Mateo, 261 Cal. Rptr. 520, 528 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)
(considering equal protection).
276. Press, 667 P.2d at 708.
277. Id. (“There can be no doubt that vindication of the [free speech] rights at stake
in this litigation effectuated fundamental constitutional principles,” which “benefits
society as a whole” because “only by protecting each individual’s free speech and petition
rights will society’s general interests in these rights be secured.”).
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and statutory remedies. This approach makes the constitutional privacy
claim viable enough that it can be a basis for relief but not so attractive
that litigants will rush to the courthouse. This approach, therefore, addresses
the Lucas–George concern that an overpowered constitutional privacy
right would unleash a flood of litigation and upend California business
and government,278 while vindicating Justice Mosk’s position that the voters
intended to impose a compelling public need standard for California
constitutional privacy violations.279
VI. CONCLUSION
California voters intended the Privacy Initiative to elevate the right to
privacy to constitutional stature. Those voters understood that the right to
privacy was “fundamental” and “essential” and made clear their intent that
the “right should be abridged only when there is compelling public need.”280
Yet in Hill, the California Supreme Court eschewed the “compelling
public need” standard based on faulty analysis and fears that the voters’
standard was unworkable, and substituted its own test for analyzing
constitutional privacy claims. 281 The Hill–Loder conclusion that the
“compelling public need” standard does not apply to constitutional privacy
claims is badly reasoned, at odds with foundational principles governing
constitutional interpretation, and upended voter intent.
The result is that the California constitutional privacy right is a nullity.
That is error because no part of California’s constitution is meaningless.
Section 26 of article I states: “The provisions of this Constitution are
mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to
be otherwise.”282 This means that the privacy provision in article I, section
1 is self-executing.283 The California constitutional privacy right needs no
statutory or common law justification. It exists on its own merit, but the
state’s courts have wrongly conflated the constitutional with the statutory
and common law rights. The voters did not intend to codify the existing
common law privacy right; therefore, the voters must have intended to do
something new and different, and the constitutional privacy right must
guard something beyond the common law and statutory protections.284

278. See supra Section IV.A.
279. Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 679, 700–01 (Cal. 1994).
280. Id. at 645.
281. Id. at 654.
282. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 26.
283. See State Bd. of Educ. v. Levit, 343 P.2d 8, 18–19 (Cal. 1959); French v. Jordan,
172 P.2d 46, 49 (Cal. 1946).
284. “Our reference to the common law as background to the California constitutional
right to privacy is not intended to suggest that the constitutional right is circumscribed by
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Yet the existing doctrine conflates the constitutional and common
law protections.
This should not be so. The California Supreme Court should revisit the
issue and abrogate Hill–Loder. This idea is supported by several general
principles guiding the judicial role. Article I, section 26’s interpretive
principle not only commands that constitutional provisions must be obeyed,
“but that disobedience of them is prohibited.”285 Likewise, the state courts
have a duty to validate the electorate’s intent:
[They must] give effect to every clause and word of the constitution, and . . . take
care that it shall not be frittered away by subtle or refined or ingenious
speculation. The people used plain language in their organic law to express their
intent in language which cannot be misunderstood, and [the courts] must hold that
they meant what they said.286

It may well be that applying a compelling public need standard to
constitutional privacy claims is unwise, or bad public policy, or will create
problematic results. But courts should not impose their public policy views
under the guise of interpretation, and courts “may not . . . interpret [initiative]
measure[s] in a way that the electorate did not contemplate: the voters
should get what they enacted, not more and not less.”287 If the electorate
becomes dissatisfied with the results of its act, it is within the electorate’s
power to fix the problem it created.
The California Supreme Court should revisit its privacy doctrine and
adopt an approach that is true to the voters’ intent that constitutional privacy
violations be judged against a “compelling public need” standard. Doing
so would reaffirm individual privacy rights and prevent lower courts from
being overly deferential to intruders’ justifications for their conduct. As
Justice Mosk said, “Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not
to reject it merely because it comes late.”288

the common law tort. The ballot arguments do not reveal any such limitation.” Hill, 865
P.2d at 648.
285. Levit, 343 P.2d at 19.
286. Id.
287. Hodges v. Superior Court, 980 P.2d 433, 437 (Cal. 1999); Ross v. RagingWire
Telecomms., Inc., 174 P.3d 200, 207 (Cal. 2008) (“[T]o construe an initiative statute to
have substantial unintended consequences strengthens neither the initiative power nor the
democratic process.”).
288. Smith v. Anderson, 433 P.2d 183, 191 (Cal. 1967) (Mosk, J., concurring) (quoting
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 47 (1949) (Rutledge, J., dissenting)).
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